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An interdisciplinary analysis of the post-Cold War world to determine the
optimal strategy to attain the national interests of the United States, and the
requisite logistic structure to support that strategy. The optimal solution is
found to be a strategy based on multinational defense centered on a perma-
nent force of United Nations garrison port complexes. This multilateral force
would be augmented by as small a national defense force as necessary to en-
sure national security.
The thesis endeavors to reconnect the cultural and philosophical past of
the United States with its immediate future. National interests are identified
through examination of American Pragmatism and the philosophies of John
Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. To determine the current status of com-
mon defense, based upon the Foreign Military Sales system, an analysis of
current data is accomplished.
Future threats to the United States are examined with special emphasis
on nuclear terrorism. The ability of Islamic nations in North Africa and the
Middle East to produce significant quantities of uranium is demonstrated. The
grave political as well as ongoing environmental consequences of this recent
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A. LOGISTICS FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Logistics for the new world order is a broad and unexplored topic. It is all
too easy to dismiss logistics as the work-a-day preparations for supporting the
defense structure, and miss the significance of the changes which have
occurred in the world and how substantially these changes have affected logis-
tics requirements. A spokesman for the Secretary of the Navy's Office of
Program Appraisal delineated lessons learned from the "Desert Shield" oper-
ation in the Persian Gulf [Ref. 1]. Among the lessons is that strategy becomes
logistics when it moves from paper to action. In fact, logistics and strategy are in-
separable. As the world assumes a new order, strategy and logistics must
change.
B. NATIONAL INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGY
This thesis addresses the fundamental question of what our national
strategy needs to be and what forms our logistic structure can assume. It in-
volves a close examination of ourselves as a nation. The present and future
threats to the United States are examined. Potential logistic structures are ex-
amined in light of the threats and conclusions are made.
1. A Return to the Basics
Critical to this analysis of national strategy is the most basic issue of
national interests. Just as no sound building can be built upon an unsound
foundation, no national strategy can be built upon erroneous national interests.
Often this is a sin of omission, where a strategic planner assumes some
national interests without exhaustively examining their genuineness. An
example is the assumption that it is in our national interest to place our
economic well being ahead of our trading partners. It is not so. Nor, however,
is the converse true. A problem arises when the erroneous national interests
are translated into national objectives, and we attack the objectives through
some national strategy that at best is ineffective at addressing our national in-
terests and at worst actually run counter them.
2. Allies and Coalitions
The national strategy which is discussed in Chapter III is centered
around coalitions and allies. It examines the problem that very few natural
allies exist, and how a poor selection of allies will defeat our national interests.
This is because the national interests of the United States are based upon the
needs of free men and any alliance formed with a repressive government
undermines these national interests. This is a critical area for planning logistic
support because it necessitates rethinking some of the cooperative
arrangements which were formed during the Cold War.
3. The Impact of Foreign Military Sales
The fourth chapter investigates the Foreign Military Sales option for
creating common defense. It is examined from the perspective of the client
state. Unfortunately, it is found to be ineffective at providing defensive
strength while being unduly expensive for the American taxpayer. Necessary
improvements to the system are suggested. Foreign Military Sales provide a
needed means of common defense, but they must be better managed.
National strategy for the new world order must address the emerg-
ing landscape of a multipolar world. Whereas in the recent past it was possible
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to define our defensive needs according to the capabilities of the Soviet bloc,
today the whole world must be scanned.
4. Nuclear Terrorism and a Conflict in Cultures
Intrinsic conflicts arise where closed societies are confronted by the
expanding influence of American culture. These conflicts are most problem-
atical when the dosed societies have the military power to threaten the United
States and its allies. Therefore, a close examination of the problem of nuclear
proliferation in third world nations-especially among the nations along the
southern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea-is undertaken in Chapter V.
C. FUTURE STRUCTURES
The logistic structures which may satisfy future national strategy are ex-
plored in Chapters VI and VII. At one extreme, a system of United Nations
garrison port complexes is explored as a means of providing common defense
for all nations of the world. At the opposite extreme, necessary elements of
unilateral defense are examined. These include utilizing mobile ocean basing
to replace basing in foreign countries and a system of barge delivery to
increase sealift capacity. The choice between unilateral defense and coalition
defense is examined in terms of desirability and affordability.
The optimal solution to attaining national objectives changes with the
restructuring of world power. In a strongly polarized world the strategy of
multinational cooperation and common defense was an extravagance which
could not be afforded. In a multipolar world that is generally at peace, strong
unilateral powers may be an extravagance that cannot be afforded. The world
is clearly headed in the direction of multinational cooperation and, as the
threat to the United States from the Soviet Union diminishes, we must shift to
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multilateral arrangements with less investment in a nationally unique defense
structure.
D. AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION
Chapter VIII presents the optimal solution to accomplish our national
interests. The impact of this potential change on the logistician is the
understanding that our present structure must change. Multilateral forces are
equipped with weapons and support equipment from many lands. Even if the
bulk of the gear is from the United States, much of it will not be. Codifying the
repair parts, purchasing the materials, and dealing with foreign suppliers
demand new skills. Weapons procurement, presuming it is freed from "made
in the U. S. A." constraints, will be vastly changed. All of this will occur while
our independent national forces are being reduced.
This thesis endeavors to reconnect the cultural and philosophical past of
the United States with its immediate future. It strives to discover the national
strategy which-whether clearly articulated by the leadership or not-is most
likely to evolve. Strategy becomes logistics when it moves from paper into
action. This is as true whether the strategy is long-planned, tested, and war-
gamed or if it is invented in the heat of the moment. While it is not for the
logistician to devise strategy, it is only prudent for him to discern through
whatever means are available what the strategy will be.
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II. A NEW WORLD ORDER
A. EMERGENCE OF A NEW ORDER
Today in 1990, just as the United States has achieved military
preeminence in the world by virtue of the rapid economic and social decline of
the Soviet Union, there are voices who question the value of being a military
superpower when there are no others to rival that stature. Our former enemies
have eschewed military achievements in favor of economic concerns. No new
nation is rising up to threaten the world with domination. Therefore, why
should we continue to pursue military strength, especially if it can only be done
at the expense of improving social or economic conditions? This is an
essential question, and the answer to it will drive not only America's future, but
the rest of the world for the foreseeable future.
The United States is an insular, comfortable, peaceful nation that is unique
in the world. It is also young, and without an extensive cultural basis for
involvement in world politics. Our belated entry into two world wars
underscores more our desire to live apart than our desire to help enforce
justice and decency. The Cold War, which may be concluding, had thrust us
into the world and caused us to play an important role in the world that
otherwise we would not have undertaken. Today, with the impetus of the
East/West clash weakening, it is quite possible for the United States to opt to
"disentangle" itself from foreign alignments.
A clear understanding of the national interests and national objectives of
the United States is generally admitted to be an important step in formulating
the conduct of international negotiations of any sort. Unfortunately, the
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interests and objectives cited are not often consistently and analytically
developed. This chapter is an effort to build the requisite foundation for all of
our national strategy and related negotiations. As any builder knows, flaws in
the foundation cannot be repaired, and the structure will always be weakened.
If we do not take particular care at this stage, we will subsequently fail.
The design of a logistics structure to support military strategy, which is the
ultimate aim of this thesis, must await determination of the military strategy.
Similarly, military strategy must await the formulation of national strategy. In
order to rationally develop the logistic structures which will be required in the
future, it is necessary to reevaluate our national strategy in the light of the
many changes which the world has recently undergone. This chapter lays
down the national objectives and discusses the strategies appropriate to
achieve them. Often the strategies do not involve military action, and hence
require no logistic support. Regardless of the need for military strategy, a full
examination is in order to better ground the understanding of the role of
America in the new world order.
Although the temptation is strong to immediately jump into a discussion
of "potential military contests" and try to establish rationalized underpinnings
for a defense budget, it is premature to do so. Strategy is not properly
formulated by merely trying to identify and avoid risks. Good strategy is a
positive process. It is the plan by which improvements are achieved. Our
national strategy must provide not merely for our survival but for our triumph.
The only Western precedent for the present status of the United States is
the Roman Empire. As Rome expanded in physical dimensions, it also
expanded in its variety of people and cultures. It provided a legal system and
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physical infrastructures in the lands it incorporated. But, as Gibbon pointed
out, the Roman Empire began to decline as soon as it stopped growing. [Ref. 2]
A lack of forward motion, the loss of an ultimate goal, is just as deadly for large
organizations as it is for small. The United States must, therefore, continue to
expand and triumph in the international arena. This is not, fortunately, a goal
that is in deadly conflict with other nations, because the expansion is not of
real estate.
The end of East/West conflict for many is the achievement of the ultimate
goal. It is the end, and no new direction exists. This does not merely apply to
hard line anti-Communists. It also applies to the billions of people who are a
part of the East that has failed. Once there was a Lenin, a Mao, even a Stalin in
whom to believe. Today there is only poverty and proof that their system is a
failure. The future is now for the citizens of the Soviet Union and China, and it
is decidedly bleak. There are no more dreams, no more suppression of today's
needs in service of the ultimate triumph of world socialism, only poverty and
tyranny.
The magnitude of the failure of communism is so huge that it is difficult to
comprehend. It is of a scale similar to having Christ discredited and the
Roman Catholic Church abolished by the Pope. The monster by the name of
Communism is dead, but the corpse still remains rotting and stinking. The
death smell permeates every aspect of life in the East. This is an epochal time.
It is not merely the "end of the Central Front."
Although for the proponents of communism the road is at an end, for
Americans the ultimate goal is not yet at hand. The United States has
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outlasted the threat of world socialism, but it has not triumphed. The national
strategy to achieve the victory is in need of redefinition.
It is time to reexamine, and if need be to redefine our national objectives.
Once this is accomplished we will be able to redetermine our national strategy.
The changes in the world over the past few years must be examined. The
discrediting of socialist theory is not the only significant event that has
occurred.
B. DEFINITION OF OUR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Our national objectives, which our strategy aims to achieve, are a function
of our character and needs. We need to survive. We need to be secure in our
homes. So much is obvious. Less obvious is our need to proselytize the belief
that the individual, the single being, is the only legitimate source of power in
the state. No matter how difficult and clumsy the efforts to achieve it, the state
must be made subservient to the individual. Furthermore, all social
organizations must be subservient to the individual. This includes political
parties, churches, the aristocracy, and corporations. Many side effects follow
from this primary notion. The sovereign individual can make his own living as
he chooses: capitalism. The individual can voice his opinion. He cannot be
denied access to the opinions of others. He can run for office, or at the very
least vote to help determine who will hold office. Most of all, he is free to be-
come the best person that he is capable of becoming.
The national objective to promote democracy has many ramifications
beyond encouraging others to hold elections in their nations. The belief that
the individual is the source of legitimacy for the state is, first of all, an irrational
idea. There is no incontrovertible evidence that social structures must be so
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organized. Nevertheless, we believe it to be the case, and will die if necessary
to ensure it is so. We act upon our faith that the individual is paramount, and
we preach it as religion to the world. Unlike Communism, our belief system
has provided peace, prosperity, and personal satisfaction.
The individual is the sole source of sovereign power, yet the individual
cannot become paramount without creating a chaos of conflicting rights by the
many individuals. Consider the words of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.... [Ref. 3, p. 34]
It is easy to see the relationship between the government and the people: the
former exists by the consent of the latter. This is the thought of John Locke
who wrote that free and equal rational men could exist in relative peace.
"These men will invest their labor with the earth and the fruits thereof, and thus
earn private title to possessions previously deemed to be held in common
[Ref. 3, p. xxxvi]." Property, which Locke equated with "life, liberty, and estate,"
becomes a primary right. Government is created only secondarily to protect
the primary rights. Jean-Jacques Rousseau added to Locke's ideas the notion
that "the political subjection of the individual to the community (is) an ethical
act [Ref. 3, p. xliii]." The dynamic tension between the rights and obligations of
the individual prevent both chaos and tyranny.
To repeat the essential kernel: free and rational men, behaving in
accordance with moral laws, lab • to produce private possessions. They are
not to be subjected to any powe ither than God or the community. Powers
which must certainly not reign over men include kings, parties, aristocrats,
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religious figures, and corporations. Whenever one of the preceding powers
rises up, it must be brought down. If any caste or group asserts its
preeminence, it is denied. The pejorative terms Tory, Big Business, Big
Government, Papist, and Red all find their common emotional power in the
antithesis of Americans to organizations that would usurp the individual
sovereignty of men.
The importance of this concept cannot be over stressed. It may sound
like a tired civics lesson, but it is the single most powerful driving force in the
world. It stands behind every step in our national strategy.
1. Individual Sovereignty and American Pragmatism
The correctness of the notion of "individual sovereignty," which
already has been identified as being irrational, can be demonstrated. The
evidence flows from American Pragmatism, a philosophy best identified with
Charles Peirce. Pragmatism is a philosophy that is closely patterned on the
scientific method. It does not purport to identify "truth" in the sense of
absolute knowledge. Instead it is a process by which the best Beliefs survive
the critical examination brought about by Doubt. Peirce explains:
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind
essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and
like other habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its
dissolution) perfectly self-satisfied. Doubt is of an altogether contrary
genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. Now a privation of a
habit, in order to be anything at all, must be a condition of erratic activity
that in some way must get superseded by a habit. [Ref. 4, p. 189]
Belief, or "truth," is an accepted idea until it is challenged by doubt. However,
this is not a process that can be voluntarily accomplished.
It is important for the reader to satisfy himself that genuine doubt always
has an external origin, usually from surprise; and that it is as impossible
for a man to create in himself a genuine doubt by such an act of the will as
would suffice to imagine the condition of a mathematical theorem, as it
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would be for him to give himself a genuine surprise by a simple act of the
will. [Ref. 4, p. 189]
Once the doubt arises, it upsets the "habitual belief" and demands satisfaction.
Either the old belief is right, or another belief is better.
However the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity
which may be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly
through consciousness, one incessantly melting into another, until at last,
when it is all over--it may be in a fraction of a second, or in an hour, or
after long years--we find ourselves decided as to how we should act
under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In
other words, we have attained belief. [Ref. 4, p. 119]
Through this process every belief stands ready to be challenged whenever a
doubt arises as to its veracity. The occasion for doubt occurs in the social
context. This is important to understand. No belief or "truth" can exist in one
mind alone, it must be shared and socially verified. A blind man might hold up
an apple to a number of passers-by to ask if it is a red apple or a green apple,
he will hear their answers and accordingly judge the apple's color. A seeing
man, holding the belief his apple is red, might do the same thing, and be forced
to come to the conclusion the apple is in fact green if too many people tell him
so. The seeing man, having some basis for his belief, will require more
social verification, but if he is rational he will have to come to the conclusion
that his belief is wrong.'
1 Some readers will be uncomfortable with the idea that a random group of
people will determine the color of the apple, since they "know" the apple is "in
truth" either red or green. This is a remnant of the European philosophical
tradition. The apple may be red or green, but its "true" color will only be
exposed when an angel floats down and whispers in our ears what the color is.
Pragmatists do not wait for the announcement of absolute truth, but act as
best they can.
Nor must their action be deemed "relativistic." The Pragmatic process
takes place in a social setting, and the result is a product of the society, not the
individual. An individual cannot kill a moth, a dog, and a man and then say, "its
all relative." Society will excuse the death of the moth, fine him for the dog, and
hang him for the murder.
1l
Pragmatism is a process that only demands openness and commu-
nication. Through it beliefs can be raised, challenged, refined, and raised again.
No belief stands as "absolute knowledge," but such stuff may be beyond
mankind anyway. It works. It is so simple that many question whether
America in fact has a philosophical tradition. Pragmatism is the basis for
American belief building.
How Pragmatism relates to the belief that the individual is the source
of sovereign power is very simple. The belief, now hundreds of years old, still
stands. It is held without doubt by virtually all Americans. It has insinuated
itself, through the Pragmatic process, into the minds of billions of people
around the world. It is the germ of an idea for which no antidote has been
found. Someday it may be successfully challenged and replaced, but until that
day comes it will remain as potent and virulent as it was in 1776.
This is the cornerstone of our national objectives. From it the first
course of the foundation can be laid. It is deceptively simple, like a single
crystal, but once the seed crystal is in place a large and complex structure
begins to evolve.
C. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Locke's rational man needs a peaceful world in which to perform his
labors to produce life, liberty, and estate." Therefore, freedom from external theat
is the first national objective. Peace on American soil holds a higher priority than
It has been pointed out that a very similar process occurred in Nazi
Germany when the idea "Jews are evil' was drilled into the minds of the
people. Propaganda is most powerful when freedom to speak and debate are
denmed. Parabellum Germany stands as the best example of the danger of al-
lowing the Pragmatic Process to be controverted by tyranny. Effective dissent
is essential to the pragmatic process.
12
peace abroad, but since "every man is created equal," etc., then peace abroad
is also important. The second national objective is to enforce peace abroad. Since
the individual man is the master of his government, party, corporation, etc.,
then wherever this relationship is perverted, it must be righted. No man, of any
nation, must be abandoned in his struggle to overcome tyranny. The third
national objective is to defend men from organizations. Every individual must labor
to produce his own private property, and do so in a manner that is not harmful
of the greater community. The fourth national objective is to defend private
property. No individual must be allowed to conduct himself so that his welfare
is held above that of the greater community. The fifth national objective is to
defend men from tyrants. Every man must have the free speech and press to be
able to compare his beliefs with those of others, so that he can find the best
beliefs. The sixth and final national objective is to defend free speech and free press.
1. Peace at Home and Abroad.
These six national objectives need to be expanded and translated
into a more current context in order to formulate a national strategy from
them. The first two objectives: security of the United States and peace abroad
are relatively simple. No foreign foe will be allowed to invade or attack the
nation. Furthermore, no war will be ignored that has the potential to affect the
security of the United States. Ideally, no war will be ignored anywhere at any
time. Unfortunately, objectives cannot be fully realized at all times.
The balance between voluntarily entering our own citizenry into war,
and thereby jeopardizing their fundamental right to life, liberty, and estate, and
intervening in a war to protect the rights of others, is difficult to judge. It is
obvious that at some point we ought to intervene, and that we can do so
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sooner if we have the capacity to efficiently wage war with a minimum loss of
American lives. Using highly advanced technology and pilotless vehicles
could enable intervention in a regional war with reduced risk of American life.
The only expected costs for such intervention are the monetary costs which
impinge upon our citizens' rights to private property. Converting private
property to public taxes must only be done to improve the general welfare.
The more distant a war or police action is from America, the less rationale
there appears for our own citizens to bear the burden of the cost, whether in
blood or property.
2. Defending Men from Tyranny
The third stated national objective, to act to defend every man from
tyranny, has many forms. Citizens of nations where the government denies
them access to democratic process need our support. Citizens of nations that
deny them the right to hold the private property which their labors create also
need our support. Citizens of nations that deny freedom of expression and
press need our support. Actual examples of these situations exist in very
familiar nations. Israel has an electoral system that appears to subvert the
citizens' will in favor of a negotiating process that favors minor parties. Great
Britain has rather harsh press controls and severely limits the broadcasting of
independent television stations. Japan tries to maintain a capital market that
captures the savings of its citizens at very low interest rates for its major
corporations. Greece and Australia have tariffs as high as 100% on personal
items such as computers or automobiles. The most familiar form of tyranny,
such as that of Castro, must also be fought. Paramount, however, is the
orientation that the people of the subject nation must be defended, rather than the
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government. Where the government is a representation of the people, this is
less important. In Mexico and South Korea where it is not at all clear that the
government represents the people, it is very important to act in the defense of
the genuine sovereigns: the individuals.
3. In Defense of Private Property
The fourth stated national objective is that every individual must
labor to produce his own private property, and do so in a manner that is not
harmful to the greater community. This is more than just a supporting
statement for capitalism, it is what used to be termed the Protestant Ethic. It
necessitates the establishment of conditions which allow free and equal men
to labor and retain their earnings. As a part of the establishment of conditions,
special treatment may be accorded those who are seen to be, through no fault
of their own, less able to produce. Such special treatment can be seen in the
domestic context in such programs as Headstart and Disadvantaged and
Minority Contract Preferences. In the international context protective tariffs
within developing nations are accepted as a means of correcting the
"inequality" of the status quo. Looking at the general case rather than the
exceptions is more instructive.
a. Man as laborer and as consuner
Men must be allowed to do their best, produce the most
efficient goods, and receive the value for their labor. This is true no matter in
which nation these workers reside. Free trade both fully rewards the man-as-
laborer and minimizes the loss to the man-as-consumer. So long as the
producer does not violate the rights of his laborers or produces in a manner
harmful to the ecology, then he should be free of government interference.
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According to Locke, his right to the product of his labor is a higher claim than
any government can make. The restraint offered by Rousseau, that man has a
social contract to contribute to the general welfare, limits the worker's right to
keep all of the product of his labor. Where the balance between worker and
society is established is determined by the Pragmatic process within each
society. What is generally agreed to as reasonable is "the right point."
Between societies, naturally, there is disagreement as to the correct point.
America must argue that the correct balance is exactly as our own, and stand
ready to have our own equilibrium point redetermined if the ensuing argument
would so indicate.
b. The shifting balance
This balance point can best be seen as the overall rate of
"taxation," and it is noteworthy to see that it has changed over time within
America. When Mark Twain wrote Innocents Abroad in the late nineteenth
century, he pointedly noted the 33% tax rate imposed on most Europeans was
their downfall, and that the correct rate was nearer to the 7% back in America
[Ref. 51. For whatever the reasons, we now pay in the vicinity of 30% to support
the general welfare. We do not now, however, regularly tithe 10% of our
income to churches, spend weekends helping raise our neighbor's barns, or
open our homes to three generations of family.
c. Free trade as a logical extension
Free and equitable trade, and production within moral and
ecological guidelines, are the most common expression of this national
objective. It is a powerful objective, because it empowers the individual
citizens within foreign nations. This objective seeks to reward their labor,
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justify the reward, and dignify the laborer. It is also the case of "the seeing man
holding an apple he believes to be red." In many nations thousands of years of
acculturation has enforced the belief that the king, ruling class, or other social
organization is superior to the individual. It will take many repetitions of "the
apple is green" before such entrenched beliefs change. Our objective is to do
just that.
Japan is a nation that is presently very successful at
manufacturing consumer products, and has displaced American
manufacturers from American markets. This has created doubt that American
manufacturers know the best means to produce, and has generated a glut of
"do it the Japanese way" books. This is also an application of the Pragmatic
process, and it will generate new beliefs superior to the old. An open
society invariably benefits from interchange. The details of this controversy
will be further examined later in the chapter.
4. Defense against Tyrants
The fifth national objective is to ensure no individual is allowed to
conduct himself so that his welfare is held above that of the greater
community. This is directed against despots, dictators, and aristocrats.
Although not all men are created equal, in the sense of their physical and
mental abilities, no man is created that is superior. To be consistent with the
idea of individual sovereignty, we must not support or abet those who hold
their welfare above that of the citizens of their nations. The expression "better
the dictator we know than..." is highly corrosive of our national objectives. The
cost of supporting individuals who are tyrants is exceedingly high. Doing so
effectively short-circuits our national objectives. The only rationale for ever
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doing so is to secure a vital objective, such as preventing war against the
United States. It appears that we have supported many dictators for much
less compelling reasons. However, most instances had to do with "preventing
the spread of Communism," and were deemed appropriate. Since the threat of
Communism has thoroughly abated, there exists no present reason to
controvert our national objectives by supporting tyrants.
5. Defense of Free Speech and Free Press
The final national objective is that every man must have freedom of
speech and press. This is the objective to make open societies of all cultures.
Karl Popper championed the idea of the open society just prior to World War
II. It is a society where men rationally determine their own fate, and is
contrasted to a society where unchallengeable laws or taboos are passed
down to individuals.
In our own way of life there is, between the laws of the state on the one
hand and the taboos we habitually observe on the other [such as taboos
of politeness], an ever-widening field of personal decisions, with its
problems and responsibilities; and we know the importance of this field.
Personal decisions may lead to the alteration of taboos, and even of
political laws which are no longer taboos. The great difference is the
possibility of rational reflection on these matters. [Ref. 6, p. 173]
The open society is created when information is freely available, and the
citizens are able to rationally review their beliefs. The Pragmatic process is the
essence of the open society. However, it is easy to accept the notion of a
"rational society" without appreciating the intense discomfort which openness
brings. The citizen of an ancient society may find the uncertainty associated
with doubting and reassessing fundamental tenets as too frightening to do. If
there is no "likely outcome" to his reflections, he will not move. America,
fortunately, presents the "likely outcome." As an open society that has existed
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for several hundred years, it has worked through the problems of what may
arise if age old beliefs are abandoned for new beliefs. Popper further analyzed
that there is no choice. Everyone, if they desire to avoid "romanticized
gangsterism," which he termed Communism and Fascism alike, must venture
into the open society:
But if we wish to remain human, then there is only one way, the way into
the open society. We must go on into the unknown, the uncertain and
insecure, using what reason we may have to plan as well as we can for
both, security and freedom. [Ref. 6, p. 201]
Freedom of speech and of the press are not in themselves a guarantee that a
society is or will become open. However, it provides access for America to
insinuate our ideas into the society. Modern music, dance, television shows,
movies, and consumer products all convey a message. "Here is an alternative
culture, and it can be yours for the asking." "Why are we so rich, and you so
poor when you work so hard?" But more fundamentally, "You have dignity
and the right to make your own choices." It may seem absurd, but Rambo and
Michael Jackson advance our national objective to open the societies of
others.
D. THE NECESSARY CLASH OF CULTURES
Once a foreign society is opened, like unscrewing the top of a sealed jar,
the Pragmatic process can begin. Eventually the result will be American-like.
Examples exist: Canada is very like America, probably because of a shared
intellectual heritage. Japan and West Germany, reformed after World War II,
are now startlingly American-like compared to anything in their long histories.
Our final national objective is to gain access to other societies, and share
with them every aspect of our culture. In the process change will occur not
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only to the foreign society, but to all the open societies, as the best beliefs are
assimilated. This process might be derisively called "culture busting." It
certainly has the element of restructuring associated with it. It is an aggressive
policy. It is also a policy with some risk attached to it. Certain societies,
particularly fundamental Muslim ones, have realized the threat and have violently
acted to counter it.
Unfortunately, we have generally been unaware of the entire process.
Where risk was high, we did not proceed with caution. Where risk was
minimal, we did not move with authority. When clear signals to champion the
belief in the sovereign individual could have swayed a people, we sent mixed
or even perverted signals. It is clearly impossible to effectively delineate
national strategy without first dearly identifying our national objectives. At this
point, the national objectives have been sufficiently identified and discussed so
that a national strategy can be formulated.
E. LIMITATIONS OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
The national strategy of the United States begins with a problem. Most of
our national objectives deal with achieving goals associated with the individual
inhabitants of foreign nations, not with their governments. The United States
is, after all, fundamentally the will of our people and not the Government of the
United States. Our government is merely the plenipotentiary of our sovereign
people. The governments of other lands are, to be consistent with our view of
the individual, at best the same and at worse merely "pretenders to the crown"
of their states. When we deal with foreign states, we must strive to address the
true sovereigns and their concerns rather than make the mistake of dealing
exclusively with their governments, and potentially alienating the people. This
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inconvenience must constantly be borne in mind when trying to implement
national strategy.
To briefly reiterate the six national objectives:
1. Maintain peace from external threat.
2. Enforce peace abroad.
3. Defend men from subjugation by organizations.
4. Defend and encourage private property which is morally created.
5. Defend men from subjugation by tyrants.6. Defend free speech, free press, and open access by others.
The ultimate goal to be attained is the creation of a peaceful world,
wherein no man is subjugated by any organization or dictator, where men
labor to produce their own "life liberty, and estate," and where the laws and
customs are rationally considered in an open society. It is not utopia. It is a
system which guarantees rational conflict, but it is at least a self-evolving, self-
improving society. It is also not fully achieved.
F. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
The national strategy to defend against foreign enemies is developed as a
function of the assessment of threat. Who desires to do violence to America?
How capable are they? How likely are they to act? Will others join the list of
foes, and why? The key question is why another nation would want to do
violence to America.
Communist states understood the essential conflict between their
national objectives and our own. We consider the individual to be paramount;
they consider the individual to be a mere atom of the socialist state. A violent
dimension to the conflict must be considered possible.
Other dosed societies that feel threatened by our national objectives
must also consider violent solutions to meet that threat. The violent reactions
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range from the terrorist attack to a full scale world war. These societies or
governments must be watched and defended against. Some of these societies,
such as the tribal societies of Africa, pose no significant threat. Others are very
dangerous. Foremost are those closed societies which we must deal with to
maintain our supplies: read "oil." Figure 1 illustrates the conformity of the
world's oil resources with the Islamic World.
i M Mii
The Islamic World 60% of the World's Oil Reserves
Figure 1. The Coincidence of Oil and the Islamic World [Ref. 71
Islam is not singled out as the only closed society in the world. It is not even a
"society," but rather is a series of cultures and nations. It is, however, the center
of resistance to the Western Influence that our national objectives aim to
advance. It is also the region of the greatest arms proliferation that could
prove capable of significant war. Ballistic missiles, chemical and biological
weapons, and nuclear arms exist in many of these nations which, at their base,
are fundamentally opposed to the national objectives of the United States.
Opposition also exists in Communist countries, such as North Korea,
China, and the Soviet Union. Changes have occurred, but these societies have
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not changed so much that they are open and peaceful. Significantly, the realm
of possibilities which lie before the Soviet Union-after-Communism (or China-
after-Communism should such occur) include many things in addition to
American-style democracy. Fractionalization into a series of closed societies, a
process that is termed "Africanization," may well happen. If Africanization
occurs, the sum of the constituent parts of the Soviet Union may become more
threatening to the United States because each could very well end up armed
with nuclear weapons. Each would have to be dealt with separately but
simultaneously. The interests and arms of each could be merged with a
neighboring state (such as Iran) with the result that a grave threat to the United
States could immediately arise.
1. Military-Political States and Trading States
According to Richard Rosecrance, there are two fundamental types
of states: military-political states and trading states. This distinction is intro-
duced here because each type of state requires a different approach. The mili-
tary-political state arose with the birth of nationalism and conscript armies in
the 1800's. It is the world of power politics, empire-building, and wars.
Preservation required watching the strength of neighboring states.
But how could one state prevent another from gaining more power?
Only by defeating it and then reducing its size and strength. Hence the
maintenance of equality and equilibrium frequently required war, and the
ruling presumption of the Western military-politic system was that
war could rationally be waged. The objective of the state system could
never be peace, certainly not peace as an overriding objective. [Ref. 8, pp.
99-100]
The Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and many of the closed
societies such as Iraq are military-political states. War is, for them, simply part
of the system of interactions between states and must be either waged or
23
prepared to be waged. Although war is antithetical to the national objectives
of the United States, it would be criminally imprudent to fail to prepare to deal
with military-political states.
In general, the national strategy for dealing with these states is to
maintain the military power necessary to deter them from acting, to defeat
them should general war arise, and to prevent "squirrel bite" attacks-such as
terrorist acts-against Americans and their property. Additionally, our strategy
is to maintain as much friendly contact with them as possible, and continue to
open their societies.
A clearly defined military policy that is publicly announced is "an
amateurish idea," according to Walter Lippmann.
These are the amateurs [at diplomacy], some of them wearing uniforms,
who think they can solve the Far Eastern problem by a series of public
commitments.. .What they succeed in doing in their clamor for public
commitments of this kind is: (a) to embarrass the serious and well-in-
formed soldiers and civilians who know what it would mean and what it
would cost to make good on all these threats; (b) to alienate great mul-
titudes of the people of Asia and of Europe who fear and distrust a nation
which talks so much and on so many different occasions about the
terrible destruction and human agony it can and may cause; (c) to im-
prison our diplomacy in the formula of all or nothing-in a self-inflicted
strait jacket where it can do nothing by negotiation because that is by
definition appeasement and it can do nothing by the big threats because
that-in their own sober second thoughts-is suicide. [Ref. 9]
It is sufficient to gauge the potential lengths of the supply lines and physical
properties of the lands where military actions may take place. To draw up
invasion plans for every potential contingency and publicly display them is of
no merit. It will not be done here.
2. Strategic Defense
This is the first national objective. The rationale behind potential
enemies have been identified. States that have the power to annihilate the
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United States through the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles are being
countered by a program of deterrence: mutually assured destruction. Such a
policy is based upon a slippery rock. It is a "rational" deterrence. Rational men
would not act so as to destroy the world. Unfortunately, ancient dosed
societies are by their definition "irrational." In Popper's terms, these are
societies that are regulated by taboos that are beyond man's ability to
question. To act in defense of the "irrational" does not imply "rational
behavior." The Soviet Union and China are not ancient closed societies: they
are dosed dictatorships. Some other potential adversaries are ancient dosed
societies, and it is important to note that the deterrence that has worked in the past
may deter them not at all.
3. Defending the Brotherhood of Man
The second national objective is to enforce peace abroad. Wars are
seldom fought between the peoples of states. That is to say, wars are usually
fought by governments with at least one government seeking to impress its will
on the other. The primary rights of the individuals-for peace, liberty, and
estate-are invariably violated. Finding the guilty party is often easier than
finding an innocent party: both governments often are acting in violation of
their people's rights. When an innocent party can be identified, it should be
aided. When both sides are guilty, the war should be minimized.
This national objective is difficult to pursue because in every case it
necessitates some measure of impingement upon the rights of Americans. In
the extreme case it requires many American lives. At the very least it requires
an assessment of the property of Americans. Nevertheless, preserving peace
is such an important good that it must be done. Our civilian and military
25
leadership must invigorate the public to support wise peacekeeping efforts. To
deny the responsibility is to deny the veracity of the central tenet: that the
individual man is the source of legitimate power in society.
Keeping the peace does not merely mean having conventional
forces to counter aggression. It has another, less deadly, aspect: maintaining
free world trade. The military-political structure of the nineteenth century was
given a brief respite during a period of "free trade." How this period ended,
and what the results were, clearly indicates why free trade is so important to
maintain.
...their temporary conversion to free trade in the 1860's had only been a
tactical concession, to be taken back when the depression of 1873-96
made it clear that all countries could not prosper....
High tariffs made return to a territorial policy axiomatic. Access to
markets and raw materials would no longer be sufficient because that
access was being progressively diminished. Only control of territory
provided a guarantee that the market was not captive. [Ref 8, p. 98]
World War I resulted. Today the list of nations that absolutely require access
to foreign-owned resources is exhaustively long. Free trade must
continue. The only alternative is war. Maintaining free trade, and wisely
negotiating corrections to deviations from free trade, is a very real form of
avoiding wars.
The more active role in enforcing peace is through intervention.
There is a continuum of involvement regarding intervention. At the beginning
end is merely showing the flag; at the opposite extreme is the commitment of
large numbers of ground forces. Where on the continuum the appropriate
response lies is very hard to determine. As previously discussed, the
advantage of having high-tech weapons that can deliver significant results
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with little risk of American lives lets our leadership opt for active involvement
much sooner than otherwise would be possible.
a. The problem of "free riders"
Other nations of the world, especially the "trading states,"
accrue benefits from our efforts at maintaining the peace. Trading states, such
as Japan,
have accepted almost complete dependence on the resources and
markets provided by the world. No longer is there any disposition to try
to conquer militarily the lands, resources, and markets that (it) thinks it
might need. [Ref 8, p. 481
A peaceful world and free markets make it possible for trading
states to prosper and serve their citizens. It would seem that some sort of fee
ought to be extracted for providing such a valuable service. However, it is
absolutely wrong to encourage a trading state like Japan to arm itself to help
maintain the peace. If it were to do so it would cease to be a "trading state." It
would become again a military-political state capable of seizing resources and
markets at will. Japan failed in its international debut as a responsible power. So,
too, did Germany, France, Italy, and Russia. Only the United States has shown
that, by virtue of its central tenet, it is capable of carrying arms without using them
against the people of the world. This happy fact is offset by the enormous cost of
maintaining the forces necessary to enforce peace.
b. The problem of assessing charges
Assessing a "fee" for providing safe passage through
peaceful seas and standing ready to counter military expansion by aggressive
states, is an attractive idea. Accomplishing it it much more difficult. As with
many other situations, the "shortest route between two points is either
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unauthorized or unadvisable." Directly assessing the beneficiaries of our
peacekeeping places their assets under our unilateral control. Athens
accomplished this with the Delian League, and managed to turn the annual
tribute from league members into the basis for its empire. While this might
appear to be an attractive idea for "Athenians," it presents a situation ripe for
abuse. Instead of extracting annual tribute from beneficiaries, it would be
better to bear the brunt of the expense ourselves as our contribution to the
general welfare.
Benefiting trading states must, however, make contributions to
the general welfare themselves. One form of contribution is to make
investments in the infrastructure of developing nations. A trading state does
not suffer from the capital drain for military expenditures, and has relatively
more capital available. By investing it in developing nations, the world
economy grows, which is to the benefit of all. Such contributions must be
recognized as being in "repayment" for the peace provided by America.
Although not the shortest distance between two points, such a system is
mutually beneficial and non-destabilizing.
4. Tyranny of Social and Religious Institutions
The third national objective is to defend men from subjugation by
organizations. The most powerful form of organization that tends to overtake
the individual is, naturally, his own government. The balance between
personal freedom and civil responsibility goes back to the debate between
Locke and Rousseau. It appears that there is no "right" answer in all times and
for all people. Does Britain extend to its citizens a strong enough right to
freedom of the press? The answer can only come from the British themselves,
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but we have the duty to press our own experience and "best answer" on the
British as an external source of doubt.
a. Fundamental Islam: a special case
Other cultures definitely dispossess their citizens of their natural
rights. As already mentioned, Islamic states tend to be more closed and
antagonistic towards Western values.
Modern Islamic reform is often depicted simply as a reaction and
response to Western imperialism-political and cultural domination by
European colonial powers.. .By the mid-nineteenth century concern for the
internal weakness of the Islamic community was compounded by the
threat of subjugation to the Christian West. The political and religio-
cultural threat of western imperialism brought forth a variety of Muslim
responses ranging from conservative religious militant rejectionism to
wholesale western-oriented adaptationism, from jihad movements to
modernist reform movements. [Ref. 10, pp. 30-1]
There is not any constant set of standards that apply throughout the Islamic
world. As the author indicates, states vary from being "western" to being
extremely fundamentalist. It is the idea of jihad or struggle that poses the
greatest problem to those who would oppose or reform Islamic states.
Given common misconceptions regarding jihad, some clarification is
necessary. If Westerners are too quick to see Islam as a religion of holy
war, modern Muslim apologists have tended to present jihad in early
Islam as simply defensive in nature. In its most general sense and
application in Muslim life, jihad refers to the vocation of Muslims to strive
or struggle to realize God's will, to lead a virtuous life. This includes the
Muslims' universal mission and obligation to spread God's will and rule.
As Muslim armies advanced out of Arabia and penetrated new areas, the
people were offered three choices: (1) conversion, that is to become a
member of the Muslim community with its rights and duties, (2)
acceptance of Muslim rule as "protected" people; and, if neither the first
nor second options were accepted, (3) battle or the sword. [Ref 10, p. 10]
The "three choices" of the jihad do not leave much room for the indiviaual
rights of the conquered, as addressed above regarding the first two national
objectives. The individual rights of the "soldier of the jihad" are even more
restricted, however. There was no news report on the Iran-Iraq War that
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moved the American people more than the one which showed troops of
innocent pre-teenage Iranian soldiers being "sent to Allah."
The appropriate national strategy is to maintain as many ties
and associations with these cultures as possible, and try to affect modification
of the basic tenets of the society. The Islamic world is not the only place where
violence is done to individual rights. Another place, Japan, is of even greater
concern to America.
b. Threat of Japan, Inc.
Japan is a land where there is a close orchestration of the rights
of the corporations over the rights of the people. The impressive success of
the economy of Japan has been built upon the bones of its people. High
consumer prices, maintained by legal cartels, deprives the people of fair value
for their earnings. Low interest rates, maintdned by the government to help
corporations raise capital at advantageous rates, also deprives the people of
their earnings. Moreover, the modern "triangular trade" arrangement of
Japanese corporations appears to deny the social responsibility of paying
taxes anywhere. In this arrangement sales are made in the United States with
costs shown as being very nearly equal to sales price. Costs are paid to factory
subsidiaries in third world Asian lands such as Malaysia, where very large
profits are shown, but are virtually untaxed. The profits flow back to Japan
through exorbitant "management fees" that show no profits.
Tax avoidance has come under federal scrutiny. The following
report summarizes Congressional investigations into the matter.
Congressional investigators and tax officials reported new evidence
today that American subsidiaries of foreign automobile and electronics
companies have been underpaying Federal income taxes, with at least $13
billion in back taxes now being sought by the Government.. .The
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subcommittee staff reviewed 106 Federal income tax returns filed by
American subsidiaries of 18 foreign electronics companies in the last
decade. "On these returns," it said, "the companies reported $116 billion
in gross receipts and paid $654 million, or one-half of 1 percent, in Federal
income tax. Over 10 years, only nine companies reported positive taxable
income." [Ref. 11]
The highly successful Japanese management practices which
were previously mentioned are a source of doubt within America. Our man-
ufacturing processes must be reevaluated because of this example of success.
However, wherever Japanese success is built upon the unacceptable sacrifices
of the people, the new methods will be rejected. These areas must be made
into sources of doubt for the Japanese, and cause them to reconsider "success"
at the price of individual freedoms. It is unlikely that America will change such
basic tenets, but it is likely that we will adapt and adopt any non-conflicting
new ideas. In this way we gain from the experience.
The Japanese culture appears to bow before the Samurai Class
of the modern corporation, and all other players are secondary [Ref 121. This is
contrary to our national objective of freeing men from subjugation by or-
ganizations. We must counter the unfair marketing and capital-raising
structure within Japan through constant negotiations. There is absolutely no need
to consider war with Japan, since as a trading state it is incapable of waging
war, and since we must endeavor to maintain it as a trading state and not
a military power. Our differences must be settled at a bargaining table and not
on a tableland.
5. In Defense of Free Enterprise
Our fourth national objective is to defend and encourage the cre-
ation of private property. As John Locke said, property is the actualization of
"life, liberty, and estate." Those who labor but lack the property which they
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have created, therefore, are denied a primary right. This is distinct from a
general notion of "private property," because it links the creation of the prop-
erty with the ownership. The pioneer who "wrests the farmland from the
primordial forest" obviously owns it. The great-grand children who subse-
quently lease it to tenant farmers have a less clear claim on it. For this reason,
inheritance taxes are generally considered to be fair and reasonable reversions
of property back to the society in general. The primary notion, that men must
be able to benefit from their own labor, is the engine that drives our society.
Prosperity is not accidental, it is the function of work, creativity, and
perseverance. Unfortunately, some prosperity is an accident of birth, but this
defect can be mitigated if it is seen that the prosperity of one denies the
prosperity of others.
As a national objective, this idea underscores the necessity to sup-
port land redistribution where colonial practices created a situation where
prosperity is not possible for the people who work the land. It compels us to
oppose tariff barriers that enrich a few by denying access to fair-priced com-
modities by the mass of people. But more than anything else, it demands that
we oppose the virtual-slavery imposed by communist states.
The national objective to defend and encourage private property is
best served in the diplomatic arena. There may arise an occasion when the
force of arms can be used to defend the right to property without denying the
right to life, but the occasion would be rare.
6. In Opposition to Tyrants
The fifth national objective is to defend men from tyrants. It is also
the national objective observed mostly in the breach rather than in its
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accomplishment. If no man ought to be allowed to impose his will on others,
this objective follows. However, we did not oppose with armed force Stalin,
Mao, Idi Amin, Castro, Marcos, or Khomeini. We have opposed some
dictators, but only because of the threat they caused to our own people. This
is because the relative cost of American lives is viewed as greater than the cost
of allowing other people to be subjugated. Lives count. So, however, does the
denial of rights to other people.
The major problem with accomplishing this national objective is
the structure of international law. Sovereignty is not, in international law,
something the common individual can have. This is in conflict with our
American tradition, and is caused by the fact that monarches wrote interna-
tional law. For all practical purposes the "sovereign power" of a nation rests
with its government or dictator. If we, as the government of the United States,
are to deal with another nation, we must deal with these entities. When a
nation aligns itself with our purposes, we have tended to support it regardless
of the composition of its leadership. This has been very destructive of the
accomplishment of our ultimate national objectives.
Short term gains are favored over long term victories. The revulsion
for tyrants does not seem to be equally shared by all members of our gov-
ernment. Perhaps the elitist types who serve within our diplomatic corps are
not fully acculturated to accept the notion of "individual as sovereign," and
accept the idea that some men have superior rights to others. For whatever
the reason, we have suffered nothing but humiliation for our support for
tyrants.
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Since this nationa! objective has not often been served by armed
force, it is must remain with the diplomats who have abused it so sorely.
When the opportunity arises for the use of arms against a dictator, such as
Operation Just Cause, the military must be ready to quickly and thoroughly
defeat him. Half-measures are deadly.
7. In Defense of an Open Society
The final national objective is to fight for freedom of the press and
speech. For the Pragmatic process to work, the social setting must be greater
than one. With two or more individuals able to communicate, ideas are tested
and improved. By expanding the social ring to all mankind, it is possible to find
the very best beliefs. Although the price of admission is the willingness to risk
all beliefs, the price is not too high to pay. Our experience has been very good.
Our culture has been able to adapt and evolve as new discoveries have
emerged. Most important, the tendency to enforce dogma on others has been
mitigated by the ability to rationally debate the ideas behind our beliefs.
Consonance does not come immediately if at all. A pluralistic society that
tolerates a broad range of beliefs is the result. This is in stark contrast to the
three choices of the jihad: convert, submit, or die.
The strategy to accomplish this national objective begins with such
things as Radio Free Europe, and ends with open trade and commerce.
American movies, television, and music probably do more to spread the be-
liefs commonly held in our society than any other means. As a state, we can
argue for the rights of freedom of the press and speech. At times we have
been able to provide the platform from which dissidents have spoken to their
countrymen. None of these measures require military action. Most of them
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do not even require governmental action. We must, however, be ever mindful
that the process of c iltural melding can generate powerful enmity.
In conclusion, the national strategy to achieve the goals consistent
with our objectives is positive. Most aspects of the strategy demand diplo-
matic negotiations, but some aspects demand military action. Without close
examination, it would be impossible to see where some strategies directly con-
tradict others. All players-those with striped pants and those with battle dress
uniforms-must understand the whole strategy. America has been and will
remain the hope of the world. An era of remarkable opportunity has suddenly
opened, and we must move ahead.
35
III. NATIONAL STRATEGY
The means of accomplishing national objectives is our national strategy.
How we plan to oppose external threats, enforce peace, defend both our and
others' rights to private property and freedom from oppression is a function of
what is possible. We cannot afford to act alone in all of our endeavors.
Fortunately, it is not necessary for us to go it alone.
The national objectives of the United States are consistent with most of
the people in the world. As we seek to accomplish them, we do not frighten or
threaten most people. From among these people we can expect to find allies.
Those who feel our national objectives are threatening, either because they
represent oppressive regimes or wish to propagate closed societies, are not
natural allies. Depending on the degree of perceived threat, these people may
become our enemies.
A. IN SEARCH OF ALLIES
The United States cannot achieve security in the world without the co-
operation of others. A notable example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, which has been the primary means of countering the threat of
Soviet aggression in Western Europe for the past four decades. In addition the
United States has bases located on the soil of foreign nations around the world
to effect stationing of military power closer to the areas of expected hostilities.
Both of these means entail physical presence of U. S. forces.
A legal basis for presence of U. S. military interest exists with many na-
tions. This type of presence is effected by treaties of mutual defense. Legal
presence is less effective than physical presence for obvious reasons: the
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requisite moves to act upon treaty "obligations" must conjure adequate
political support in both nations before any move to physical presence. For
this reason it is much easier to establish treaty obligations than it is to establish
physical basing.
There are levels between actual basing and treaty writing. The most im-
portant level is that of creating Wartime Host Nation Agreements (WHNA).
These agreements detail the lines of command, responsibilities, and actions
which each of the participants will undertake in the event of hostilities.
Essentially, they form the capability basis of a "war plan" in anticipation of third
party aggression. WHNA's counter some of the "fog" and "resistance" of war
which Clausewitz identified. When WHNA's are tested in war games and in
joint military exercises, they gain trust with all involved and greatly increase the
value of the alliance they seek to support.
B. COMMON NATIONAL INTERESTS
No two societies hold exactly the same values and tenets. The national
interests of the United States are decidedly general and positive. However, it is
possible to have national interests that are not generally held by others or
positive in nature. An ancient country that has a traditional enemy is likely to
retain desires to punish the enemy for past wrongs. Such interests are un-
doubtedly unique to the nation and have nothing to do with a positive
improvement with the lives of men.
Hence, it is possible for the United States to line up with an "ally" who has
a parallel but different set of national interests. The impetus for forming an
alliance is often because of an ad hoc situation, such as a common enemy.
Such a basis, as Europe discovered when facing the common enemy of
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Napoleon, is not necessarily enough to sustain an alliance. Although the
temptation is strong to muster together all who would oppose a common en-
emy in the belief that a strong alliance can be formed, history indicates that at
some point-often well before a decision on the battlefield is won-the
alliance crumbles. Therein lies the distinction between natural allies and allies
of convenience.
1. Natural Allies
A people who have mutually held aims can be a natural ally. If there
is no mutual benefit, not even millions of dollars can buy our way into a nation
to, for instance, establish basing. This fact has been made clear. Despite the
notion that we pay "rent" for maintaining our forward bases in a number of
countries, we cannot view the relationship simply as leasee-leasor.
In hearings before the House of Representatives, General Graves
made this point particularly clear. His analysis under questioning is as follows:
T cannot deny the notion that we are having difficulty about rent; that is,
that the foreign government views it as rent. But I guess my attitude is,
even if it is a busted flush, we should not ever admit that. The reason I
say that is that we have had the experience that if there is not a view of
mutual benefit, you cannot pay to stay there. Witness Torrejon in Spain.
So unless you maintain the concept that it is to the mutual benefit of
the two countries, you are not going to be able to buy it. So that should
be our thrust. [Ref. 131
An ally cannot be bought. Although negotiations with any of the
host nations must deal with the topic of money, as General Graves says,
money is not the heart of the matter. The attitude of a negotiating host may
appear or even be solely concerned with maximizing their cash income, and
the position that mutual benefit is paramount "is a busted flush." Yet it must
be recalled that the genuine party which is being represented, the people of the
host nation, are distinct from the government. It should surprise no one that
38
the interests of the people, while only indirectly represented at the nego-
tiations, will ultimately prevail.
Therefore the natural allies of the United States are those peoples
who hold very similar national objectives: oppose external threats, maintain
peace, defend the people against tyranny and organizational subjugation, and
defend private property, free speech and free press. For them alliance with the
U. S. is a natural and comfortable action.
2. Ad Hoc Allies
There are other reasons for a nation to form a close relationship with
the United States. One reason is an overwhelming economic need. Saudi
Arabia, for instance, depends for its existence on the sale of oil to the West.
This fact drives Saudi Arabia into a political relationship with the United States.
The congruence of national objectives of the two nations is far from perfect.
Should another military power arise which could satisfy Saudi Arabia's needs,
the alliance with the United States could end in a moment.
France is a nation with a particularly unique set of national objec-
tives. Despite a shared intellectual heritage and political history, the United
States and France have certain objectives that actually are opposed to one an-
other. France desires to be an independent force with a unique culture and
language. The United States is de facto the predominant force, and has no
particular regard for preserving its present culture or language. In the major
objectives, however, there is congruence and, predictably, the two nations
usually fall out on the same side in important matters.
The two states discussed above serve to illustrate the fact that many
nations are other than natural allies. One large category of states exists that
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cannot be considered natural allies. These states often are those where cor-
ruption rules the government.
This phenomenon has been observed in of former colonies of Spain
and has been called the "Spanish heritage." The heritage is to have a gov-
ernment which is the means of preserving an oligarchy of corrupt interests. At
the very root of such a culture is probably the medieval church which provided
sinecures, or jobs with no work but some pay, to favored people. It became
enmeshed with the economic theory of the days of colonialism-mercantil-
ism-and formed a peculiar system of government which exists today in many
parts of the world. This rather harsh summary comes from a man who has
served as an economist for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as
managing director of his nation's central bank, and is a member of the United
Nations Committee for Development Planning: Hernando de Soto.
Peru, at; a good representation of this kind of state, is a nation that is
designed around mercantile economics. Whereas the original mercantilism
required a homeland and colonies, with the homeland importing raw materials
from the colonies and the colonies receiving all manufactured goods from the
home country, in Peru the process is carried out between the city and the
countryside. [Ref. 141 The means of enforcing this system on the peasants is
the central government: it generates laws and prohibitions in such numbers
and complexity that rural people cannot even move to the cities, much less
escape the economic oppression in the countryside.
Finding an ally in such a nation is hard to imagine. External threat is
about the only national objective that could generate a basis for doing so.
Cuban and Soviet support for wars of liberation in fact provided a basis for
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alliance. American self interest, expressed by the establishment of the Western
Hemisphere as a private sphere of interest, had the unfortunate consequence
of defending and perpetuating the status quo. For the peoples of Latin
America, the status quo is oppressive, tyrannical, and without hope of achiev-
ing private property. It is decidedly "un-American." Ironically, it is Japan, with
its ready cash to develop industries, that may move these nations beyond their
quasi-mercantilist stage.
Unfortunately, Spanish colonies were not restricted to the new
world. The Philippines are also in this category. The United States is in a
double-bind in the Philippines because of the large investment we have made
in military basing. It is impossible to maintain a close relationship with the
government and simultaneously live up to our own national objectives with
regard to the people of the Philippines.
It would be unfair to suggest that corruption is a Spanish invention.
It certainly is not, especially in the orient. However, it is necessary to point out
the inimical nature of systematic corruption and American national objectives.
In the days of East-West confrontation, we could find compelling reasons to
form alliances with many nations. Today, however, we must reexamine these
relationships and break off many of them.
C. INTERNATIONALISM: THE NEW UNITED NATIONS
In 1990 the United Nations has risen as a potent and effective political
entity, something very much like it was intended to be. For many this is a
startling development. The seminal paper on the subject of U. N. fecklessness
gives a hint that this ought not be surprising [Ref. 15]. When the superpowers
disagreed over an issue, it was usually not referred to the U. N. When Cold
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War issues were referred to it, the U. N. failed to settle any conflict. However,
when the superpowers were in agreement the U. N. had a good record of
settling conflicts. Today the list of "superpowers" is somewhat shorter. The
Soviet Union is withdrawing its standing objection to any and all American
interests. This policy is delineated in the new political thinking that allows all
nations to have legitimate interests.
1. Conflict with National Interests: Law of the Sea Convention
The only discernible limitation to the powers of the United Nations
is the conflict between vital American interests and international desires.
Obviously, this is an important area. The sovereignty of a nation is what sets it
above other organizations. In the lexicon of international law, only states have
sovereignty, despite whatever beliefs we may have about individual people
being the true sovereigns. It has been in the past an unthinkable act for a state
to surrender its sovereignty to another or to an international organization.
Doing so, surrendering sovereignty, curtails the ability to act in the interests of
one's citizens. It is a very serious subject.
The particular conflict between the United States and the United
Nations which is presently outstanding is the Law of the Sea Convention of
1982. More specifically the conflict is over Article 137, paragraph two, which
reads:
2. All rights in the resources of the Area (the international seabed) are
vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act.
These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered
from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with this
Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority. [Ref. 16, p.
1340]
This is in direct conflict with previous customary law of the seabed, which al-
lowed minerals to be extracted by individuals and kept as private property.
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[Ref. 16, p. 1342] The traditional role of private property, as discussed else-
where in this thesis, is that free and equal men invest their labor with the earth
and earn private title to possessions previously deemed to be held in
common.
The difference between allowing an enterprising man to find and
develop minerals and then taxing his profits to help support the society in
general, and proclaiming primary right to the minerals which he must "buy"
from society may not appear great. However, it is substantial. If the prece-
dence stands, then could not all mineral wealth belong first to "mankind in
general, and the United Nations in particular" also be held to be so? In fact
fresh water, arable land, and other desirable commodities could also be
"seized and redistributed" in the name of mankind.
However, the greater problem is not some imagined resource grab-
bing, but the erosion of the status of man which such an interpretation implies.
Man is no longer free and equal, but subservient to "mankind." Such a notion
is entirely inimical with American values.
The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 has, therefore, generated an
imperfect document. It is not, however, reason for the United States to aban-
don the highly desirable goal of helping the United Nations to become a
vehicle for common security.
D. SUMMARY OF OPTIONS
The United States can choose to pursue its national interests on its own,
or in the company of others. Since we cannot afford to stand entirely alone, we
must find appropriate allies and share with them the enterprise. The nations
which are very closely aligned with our own national objectives form natural
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allies. Their numbers are not large, however. Great Britain, Canada, Australia,
until recently New Zealand, and some European nations probably exhaust the
number of natural allies.
In addition to these nations are those who look after interests that are not
entirely congruent with ours. Many of these nations have been allies in the
past, owing to the overarching menace of a now less threatening common
enemy: the Soviet Union. Today, for this reason, their number is much re-
duced. It is necessary to choose from among these nations the greater part of
our allies. Wisdom is required, since if we choose nations that oppress their
people, encourage violence abroad, or deny free speech and press, then we
undercut our own interests as we try to build a structure to defend them.
The United Nations, and in particular the U. N. Security Council, has
emerged as an improving vehicle for providing common defense. If it can act
responsibly and promptly, then there is no need for any state to stand as a re-
gional arbitrator of military defense. This potential has recently arisen, and it is
treated in a later portion of the thesis.
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IV. BUILDING A COMMON DEFENSE
A. COMMON DEFENSE
The most sensible approach to accomplishing our national goals is
through cooperation with allies. Common strategy, tactics, and equipment
make common defense possible. One essential component of allied defense is
created by providing common equipment and common logistics support. The
primary means to this end is Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Allied and merely
friendly nations have, through FMS, access to well developed weapons
systems complete with technical documentation and spare part support.
Commonality of equipment and reliance upon the United States for lo-
gistic support forms bonds which should lead to actual alliance during times of
war or crisis. The following is an analysis of the FMS system based upon first-
hand experience. It is limited to a single client nation and to naval support.
Nevertheless, it provides important lessons regarding FMS.
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
An FMS client can order almost anything that the U. S. supply system
carries. To assist him in finding the material he needs, the FMS system pro-
vides the complete Identification List ( a huge microfiche file which describes
the characteristics of every item assigned a national stock number), a Master
Cross Reference List (which converts all known manufacturer's part numbers
into current stock numbers), and technical documentation for the major
equipment purchased from the United States. Technical documentation is
basically the operator's technical manuals, which show how to maintain the
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subject piece of equipment, how to break it down into its components without
damaging it, and what part numbers are assigned to each part. Additionally,
an Allowance Parts List for each piece of equipment enumerates all the parts
expected to be used for corrective and preventive maintenance and cross
references them to stock numbers.
1. Beginning with the Basics
The problems begin at the deck plate level, with the maintainer of the
equipment. English is still not a universal language, and even those who have
learned English well enough to read and understand college-level writing often
find their understanding insufficient when it comes to U. S. technical
documentation. By way of illustration, consider the two following full de-
scriptions:
1. VALVE CHK STP GLB 1.00IPS 400PSI SBU BRZ
2. VALVE CHK SWG 1.001'S 400PSI 1500FG F UN BRZ
Both of these valves are one-inch (iron pipe size), both withstand 400 pounds
per square inch of pressure, and both are check valves. Both are in fact in-
stalled in the same air conditioning system. [Ref. 17] Yet one is a globe-type
valve, and the second is a swing valve, and more important, one is sweated
(welded) into the system while the second is attached by a union connection.
A technician unable to understand all of the nuances of these cryptic
descriptions will almost invariably order replacement innards for the wrong
valve or a replacement valve that cannot be installed. Except in rare instances
no further technical documentation is provided, since in U. S. channels the
technician is expected to understand how to overhaul a simple valve.
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The above example is decidedly "mild." Even seasoned veterans are
confounded by nomenclature such as FAN VANAXIAL for a portable air
blower, and the exact nomenclature must be known before the repair parts
listing can be found. Simply put, our "technical English" is not English at all. It
is a specialized jargon beset by abbreviations that defy translation. No
Rosetta Stone exists in most foreign languages for breaking the code.2 The
technicians simply do their best. The result is a high probability of ordering
incorrect repair parts for the job. This inconvenience becomes compounded
when the delay to fill orders is encountered.
2. Playing the Game with Half of a Rulebook
Since clients are given "full membership" in the U. S. supply system
when they become FMS users, they are expected to understand all of the
workings of the system. This is unrealistic. As an example the U. S. Navy uses
Cognizance Symbols (COGs) to preface all stock numbers. These COGs help
flag special requirements and indicate who is the state-side manager of the
material. One COG is 2F, and it indicates that the item is specially managed,
and requires the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) approval prior to ordering.
When the 2F precedes the stock number of a complete fire control system,
such an onerous requirement makes sense. When it precedes the stock
number of a hydrophone (which is the underwater microphone that forms part
of a sonar system), it is less understandable. Hydrophones fail when they are
scratched, flooded, banged up, or develop corroded electrical connections.
21, myself, set out to provide such a reference, by translating into the local
language the technical abbreviation listing which prefaces the standard
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List publication, but completed only 10% of
the task during my tour of duty.
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They are regularly replaced, yet each requisition must be preceded by a formal
request for release of the item. If the message to the CNO with a copy
addressed to the hydrophone manager is not in hand when the requisition is
placed, it is automatically cancelled. Period. Any subsequent requisition for
the hydrophone will similarly be cancelled unless the CNO message has been
sent. This "2F" trap is well known to American supply types, but led one nation
to fail to receive a single replacement hydrophone for their American sonar
systems despite numerous attempts for over a number of years. The
frustration that ensued is understandable. It must be noted that the U. S.
Navy's International Logistics Office provides coordinators and dedicated
personnel to assist FMS clients. Nevertheless, many problems and
misunderstandings occur.
A similar problem arises when items which have 7H COGs 3 are in
need of replacement. The broken part, technically referred to as the "carcass,"
ought (for U. S. users must) be turned in for repair. If the maintenance tech-
nician does not know this, he will throw away the carcass and incur a "new"
refurbished part at a cost up to ten times higher than the cost of "trading in"
the carcass. When carcasses are discarded, the entire population of ready-for-
issue and awaiting-repairs parts is diminished. This creates a problem for all
users of the part, and is a cause of critical shortages.
3This is a simplification, since it is not the COG which determines whether an
item is repair able or not, but the Material Control Code that follows the COG,
e. g. 7HH. Any code of H, E, X, Q, or G indicates a repairable item. However,
the vast majority of all U. S. Navy repairables are under the 7-COG managers.
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a. Repairables as a special FMS problem
The system of having items which are deemed "repairable"
turned in, repaired, and returned to the stock of issuable parts is a major
concern of U. S. Navy support. The list of repairable items continues to grow,
and the necessity of tracking not only new items, but also carcasses is
governed by special instructions. One principle manual is the Navy
Repairables Management Manual [Ref. 18]. In addition to describing in great
detail how U. S. forces must handle repairables, the manual mentions the
simple fact that:
Each FMS case and Depot Maintenance Interservice Support Agreement
(DMISA) will constitute a separate, specific agreement made with the
foreign government or other service. It is separately funded and assumes
the same status as an individual contract. [Ref. 18, p. IX-2]
This means that Foreign Military Sales clients cannot utilize the standing sys-
tem of exchanging broken repairables for rebuilt repairables, paying only for an
"average repair cost." Instead the client must establish a case (contract cat-
egory) to have each repair individually contracted. Finding the correct facility
to estimate the cost of the repair, delivering the carcass to the facility-which is
generally a division of an American corporation-and paying for the repairs is
expensive and time consuming.
Repairable parts are generally such things as circuit cards and
power supplies. In more modern electronic equipment, repairables may
constitute 80% of the parts in the gear. The vacuum-tube-technology of the
past did not involve nearly so many repairable items. Since many FMS clients
have only been exposed to vacuum-tube-level technology, they can quickly be
overcome by the "repairables game" when they move up into more modern
equipment.
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b. Attempting to utilize the repair option
In addition to the problem of allowing the deck plate level
technician to make the "repair or replace" decision by fiat, the logistic support
of the gear itself necessarily suffers. In the first place if the repairable is to be
repaired, it must be packaged and sent to the repair facility, where it is either
immediately repaired or an estimate of the cost of repair is made. There is a
standard clause that allows immediate repair at a price not to exceed the price
of a new item, should the client desire. The time involved in shipping, awaiting
repair, being repaired, and being returned has averaged 1.2 years for the client.
However, this does not include those unfortunate incidents such as when
$88,000 of repairables were misdirected to a Boston warehouse and were
auctioned off to pay for the unpaid (unknown) warehouse cost.
C. AN FMS CASE STUDY
For whatever reasons, lengthy delays occur for FMS orders. This obser-
vation is based upon data from a major FMS client nation where the author
was stationed as an exchange officer. The following data is not conclusive,
since it is drawn from only one client, and is directed exclusively at mandatory
turn-in repairable merchandise. Nevertheless, it is important documentation
of a serious problem. Although the data consists of recorded requisitions, and
"FMS implementation records, such as [requisitions] ...are unclassified," [Ref. 19,
p. 5-8] "groupings of data" may show a complete picture which must be clas-
sified due to their presumed effects on readiness. [Ref. 19, p. 5-9] To avoid
showing too accurate a picture of the client nation's turn-over of repairable
spare parts, the data is shown only as frequency distributions, and no
indication as to how long a time period the data covers is given. Neither are
50
values entered on the vertical axes of figures which might indicate how great
the client relies upon repairable parts.
1. Establishing the "Norms" for Supply Support
In order to put the data in perspective, Figure 2 shows the
methodology of supply support which the U. S. Navy applies for activities lo-
cated outside of the continental United States. [Ref. 20]
Not in System
Not Available 15% 91 Days
30%
Not Available : E85%




Level of Support: Retail Intermediate Wholesale
Average Customer Wait Time (Issue Priority Groups I and II)
Figure 2. Logistics Support Structure
This indicates how U. S. Navy logistic support is accomplished. Ships are
supposed to normally carry and have on hand stock to satisfy 65% of all
demands. For the remaining 35% of demands, an intermediate level (such as a
forward supply point or supply ship) will provide 70% of the unsatisfied de-
mands within 11 days. The remaining 10.5% (35% times 30%) of the demands
will be satisfied from wholesale stocks or purchased from the industrial base.
The stated goal is for only 1.575% (35% times 30% times 15%) of all requisitions
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to end up being backordered by the system, and then to be delivered on
average after only 91 days. The goal is to have on average all repair parts de-
livered within 135 hours.
2. Operational Availability
This number, 135 hours, is very important when the concept of
"Operational Availability" is examined. Operational availability, usually written
as Ao, is defined by the simple equation:
Ao= UPTIME
UPTIME + DOWNTIME
to be more precise, the following version of the same equation breaks down
the "downtime" term into its components: [Ref. 211
Ao= MTBF
MTBF + MTTR + MSRT
Here "uptime" is defined as the mean time between failures (MTBF) of the
equipment, and the "downtime" is divided between the mean time to repair
(MTTR) the equipment and the mean supply response time (MSRT). 4
A piece of equipment can achieve an Ao equal to 1 only if it never
fails. If, when it fails, it can easily be repaired with repair parts that are readily
at hand, then it can have a very high Ao, approaching 1. Long delays in supply-
ing repair parts, however, will drag down the value of Ao. For a military
planner a low Ao is bad. For example if an aircraft type has an Ao of 0.5, then
the planner can only count on having one half of the aircraft available for use.
4Ao is more generally defined as being the quotient of mean-time-between-
maintenance (MTBM) and the sum of MTBM and mean-down-time. This
would also include scheduled preventative maintenance [Ref. 221. However,
restricting the term to corrective maintenance, i. e., MTBF, is both convenient
and errs on the conservative side when drawing conclusions from the data.
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Missions which require ten aircraft demand that twenty aircraft be purchased.
Purchasing equipment with high reliability (long MTBF) is important.
Designing the equipment so that it is easily maintained (short MTTR) is
important. But for a foreign client, these parameters are already established
when they purchase American equipment. The missing element is the mean
supply response time. In order for U. S. forces to operate as they are designed
to, MSRT must remain at or near 125-135 hours. If U. S. equipment in the
hands of foreign clients is to operate as it does for U. S. forces, then the MSRT
must also be near 135 hours. This provides a frame of reference for the data
which follows.
3. Observed Leadtime for FMS Orders
The average time to release a mandatory turn-in item from the U. S.
supply system to this FMS client was 269.9 days. For only issue group I and H
requisitions, this time was reduced to an average of 237.5 days. This is a con-
servative figure, since it does not include any transportation time, for multiple
requisition it assumes all items are shipped when the first one is released, for
requisitions outstanding at the time of the study accepts the estimated delivery
date, and for outstanding items with no estimated delivery date assumes
delivery within 30 days. In actuality, transportation from the inventory control
site to a freight forwarder plus ultimate transportation to the client government
and thence to the customer ought to be included in the "mean delivery time."
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Figure 3. Delivery Times, All Requisitions
FMS support is designed, according to the Security Assistance
Management Manual, to begin at the shipboard level with a 90 day stock of'
repair parts, and at the shorebase level with a 200 day stock of parts. This is
similar to how the U. S. Navy maintains support levels for its own forces. For
ships stationed outside of the continental United States, this methodology
necessitates having the portion of stock demands with priority 3 or 6 (which is
to say with Issue Group I or II)-which must be filled from wholesale stock or
from new procurement-within 27.25 days. This time includes delivery to the
ultimate customer.
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As indicated, FMS issue group I and II requisitions take almost nine
times longer to be released for shipment. In these calculations transportation
time for the foreign client is ignored, it will be remembered. It becomes im-
possible for the U. S. calculated 90-day and 200-day supply levels to keep up
with the repair part demand. The normal method of replenishing stock is to
use issue group III priority (Pri 13), and to order in multiple quantities. When
the client uses this priority and orders more than two items, the release delay
grows to an incredible 383.9 days on average.
4. Impact on Supply Support System
It is not necessary to build a queuing model to determine what
happens to the client's supply support system: for a short while it copes with
the slow replenishment rate, and then it is sucked dry like a soda straw
collapsing under the demand pressure. As the retail and intermediate support
levels collapse, the "sources of rapid support" are eliminated. Whereas the
methodology calls for 89.5% of all demands to be met at the retail and
intermediate levels, with stock exhausted and backorders piling up, the
collapsing system shifts to more and more dependence on the U. S. based
wholesale supply source. The average customer wait time grows until it is
equal to the U. S. delivery time. For these calculations, rather than using the
overall average time, the issue group I and I average of 237.5 days or 5700
hours, will be used. The logic behind this is that if the client is requisitioning to
support an unfilled demand, he will use this higher level of priority.
Returning to the idea of operational availability, Ao, it is now
possible to calculate the effects of this greatly increased mean supply response
time (MSRT). The formula to calculate Ao has only three terms: MTBF, MTTR,
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and MSRT. To achieve some level of Ao, such as 0.95, it is possible to vary
MTBF and MTTR while holding the level of MSRT at the goal of 135 hours. At
one extreme we will use a mean time between failures of 100,000 hours (over
eleven years), and solve for MTTR:
Ao= 0.95 = 100,000
100,000 + MTTR + 135
solving,
MTTR = 5128
At the other extreme, using a value for MTTR equal to zero, it is possible to
solve for the mean time before failure that is required to result in the same 0.95
value for Ao.
Ao= 0.95 = MTBF
MTBF + 0 + 135
solving,
MTBF = 2565
In fact there is an infinite number of possible values of MTBF and MTTR that
will result in Ao = 0.95 when MSRT is held to 135 hours. These possible values
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Figure 4. Relationship of MTBF and MTTR
Having established a broad range of values of MTBF and MTTR which satisfy
Ao = 0.95 and MSRT = 135, it is now possible to use these values to see how an
increase in MSRT effects Ao.
In the first case, using MTBF = 100,000 hours and MTTR = 5128, the
following value fo: operational availability is generated:
Ao= 100,000 = 0.896
100,000+5,128+5700
This is not a very large reduction in operational availability, but since it requires
an average of over eleven years of uninterrupted service, it must be
understood as an extreme value.
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In the second case, using MTBF = 2,565 hours, and MTTR = 0, the
following calculation results:
Ao= 2,565 = 0.286
2,565 + 0 + 5,700
This is a drastic reduction, and means that only 28.6% of the time will the sys-
tem be available for operation.
Plotting all values for Ao that result from the higher MSRT, Figure 5 is
generated:
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Figure 5. Relationship between MTBF and Ao
This graph is interesting because it shows the non-linear relationship between
values of MTBF/MTTR and an increase in MSRT. Where very large values of
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MTBF (and MTTR associated with those values) are used to recalculate A0
with the increased MSRT, only a modest decrease in Ao occurs. Where small
values-here values of MTBF under 5000 hours-are used, a drastic reduction in
Ao is generated. The question is which part of the curve is relevant. Being
realistic, we do not produce systems that operate for ten years without
needing corrective maintenance. Even 5,000 hours-or about 208 days-is a bit
long. Our maintenance philosophy, as evidenced in the F/A-18, is to improve
operational availability by making the mean time to repair as short as possible.
Innovative rack mounting of components allows quick access and rapid
repairs. This strongly indicates that the relevant part of the curve lies around
the 5,000 hour mark. In this region Ao is reduced, as a result of increasing
mean supply response time from 135 hours to 5700 hours, to around 0.46.
5. Impact on Military Planning
Operational availability for each of a ship's systems have to be com-
bined to determine the ship's Ao. For instance, if a planner wants to know the
probability that a ship will simultaneously have a functioning main propulsion
plant, fire control system, weapons system, communications system, and close-
in self-defense system, he has to combine the individual Ao's to generate the
probability. In the case of a warship, with Ao's of 0.95, the probability is 77%.
(The value for Ao of 0.95 is arbitrary and is only used for illustrative purposes.)
In the case calculated above, with Ao's of 0.46, the probability of finding all five
systems functioning is only 2%. The hard truth of logistics is that if it is badly
handled, it is more deadly than any enemy's bullet. In this case even if the
military operator is willing to accept having only the propulsion plant, fire
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control system, and weapons system functioning, he still has less than a 10%
chance of finding them so.
Before proceeding it is important to reiterate the limitations of these
figures. First of all, the requisition delivery times are taken from only one area:
repairable items. Repairables are as a rule critical items, the loss of a single one
results in the non-operability of the equipment. Less critical items, such as
gaskets, are also included in the average customer wait time figure. Less
expensive and more readily available repair parts would tend to lower the
average wait time. Secondly, the data is related to a single FMS client nation,
not from all clients or even a representative cross section. Third, the genera-
tion of data to illustrate how Ao varies with an increase in mean supply re-
sponse time has been arbitrarily based on an initial value of 0.95. Other initial
values could be chosen, and would result in different subsequent levels for Ao.
Nevertheless, the analysis demonstrates that significantly increasing leadtime
has a negative, possibly calamitous, impact on operational availability.
6. Sources of Leadtime Growth
The observed logistic support is at odds with the "printed word."
The Security Assistance Management Manual states that:
Normally, foreign military sales of materiel are made only when the DoD
has made or has approved plans to assure logistic support for the
expected service life of the equipment. This includes follow-on spares
support for equipment sold through FMS under established Cooperative
Logistic Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSA's) which will be afforded
the same priority as that provided equivalent U. S. forces performing a
comparable mission in the same geographical area. For other follow-on
FMS- spare parts cases, the normal lead time from procurement will apply.
[Ref. 15, p. 6-9...Under normal circumstances, the MILDEPs [military depart-
ments, e.g. U. S. Navy] will fill security assistance materiel requirements
from production on a first-in, first-out basis, utilizing normal production
lead times, iinless the DoD can meet urgent requirements from earlier
production without an undesirable effect on the combat readiness of U. S.
orces. [Ref. 19, p. 6-71
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However a caveat is added:
Material being procured or stocked specifically for FMS may be diverted
to meet higher priority foreign requirements or urgent needs of U. S.
Forces with the prior concurrence of the Director, DSAA, who will, as
appropriate, obtain policy guidance within the USDP. [Ref. 19, p. 6-7]
The defense bureaucracy is like an onion, it is comprised of many
layers. The next layer down, for U. S. Navy supply support issues, is the Naval
Supply Systems Command. In the NAVSUP Publication 541, Security
Assistance Manual, the same topic is addressed in somewhat different terms:
Under normal circumstances, security assistance material requirements
will be supplied from commercial production unless DOD can meet such
material requirements from inventor without an undesirable impact on
the combat readiness of U. S. forces. [Ref. 23]
There is no mention of treating FMS clients "with the same priority" as com-
parable U. S. forces. There is, above all, no commitment to provide logistic
support at a level anywhere comparable to U. S. forces. It will be recalled that
less than 2% of U. S. customer's requisitions are expected to be filled from
commercial production, yet for the FMS client it is the "normal source of
supply" if using regular stock has "an undesirable impact" on force readiness.
Compare the following two graphs, Figures 6 and 7. The first shows
the lead times involved in all priority 3 (issue group I) requisitions and the
second for all priority 13 (issue group M) requisitions.
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Days to Release, Priority 3 Requisitions
Mean=215.8 days, Standard Deviation=316 days
Figure 6. High Priority Item Delivery Times
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Days to Release, Priority 13
Mean=313.5, Standard Deviation=360
Figure 7. Low Priority Item Delivery Times
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The distributions are similar. Both have a large percentage of immediate de-
liveries, which can be presumed to be from on-hand stock. Then a second
"'population" of requisitions arise at about the one-year point. This corre-
sponds to the lead time associated with commercial procurement. A third
"population" is shown around the three-year period. This may represent spe-
cial problem requisitions that require retooling. As one would expect, the
higher priority requisitions received better response times.
The following two graphs, Figures 8 and 9, indicate a more dramatic
change in the pattern of lead times. The first is a summary of all requisitions
for a quantity of one each. The second summarizes all requisitions for two or
more each. These summaries include all priorities of requisitions.
I No Sw- MM= ^ g, v 0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Days to Release, Quantity = 1
Mean=265.1, Standard Deviation = 3 82.8
Figure 8. Delivery of Requisitions for One-Each
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Days to Release, Quantity greater than 2
Mean=300.6 days, Standard Deviation=308
Figure 9. Delivery of Multiple Item Requisitions
It is evident that the key element in determining if a requisition is going to be
delayed is not its priority, but its quantity. When only one part is required, the
likelihood of prompt shipment is very high. When three or more are required,
the "population" around one-year grows rapidly. These are requisitions that
are probably sent to be procured from commercial sources.
This can be more readily seen when one views a typical inventory
model. The Figure 10 illustrates how, as stock is drawn down by U. S. and FMS
client demands, it approaches a "reorder point." Once this point is reached, the
manager of the material must act to place a new order that will refill the stocks
before the remaining balance is exhausted. For the typical customer (or
perhaps only for the U. S. customer) the inventory may never reach zero:
replacement orders flow in to restock before any customer is faced with a
stockout situation. In point of fact, this is difficult to achieve, and some low
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level of stockout is usually allowed. The NAVSUP goal indicates that of the
Issue Group I and II requisitions unfilled at lower echelons of the system, will
find on average 15% of the time "the cupboards bare." But these "stockout"
requisitions are to be filled within 91 days. This is much shorter than the actual
order leadtime, and indicates that they will be filled as soon as new stock
arrives. This is very different from being made a part of a new order, which is
to say part of a new government contract, that must go through all the usual







War Reserv M ateS
Time Delay Added to FMS Order
Figure 10. Graphic Depiction of Leadtime Growth
The graph indicates that several orders are outstanding at the time the FMS
order is received, but that the FMS requirement is passed to the factory along
with the next restocking order and must await the full order leadtime. This is
clearly borne out in the previous figures which show several populations of
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order release times. As the size of an order grows, the likelihood of being
passed increases. The result is a separate population of orders that are not
filled for about one year. If FMS orders were in fact held for the next delivery,
the resulting distribution of delivery times would not have this separate
population.
7. Expediting Requirements
There is one final area which has not been discussed: special
management of important requisitions. Because only a few requisitions are at
any one time "hot," it is possible to afford them special treatment. Figure 11
shows the results of the client's attempt to expedite its most important
requirements, but without utilizing the standard U. S. Navy system for doing
0 200T 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Days to Release, "Hot List Requisitions"
Mean=281.8 days, Standard Deviation=380.3 days
Figure 11. Important, but Uncoded Requisitions
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so. This could involve passing the requisitions by telephone instead of regular
message, providing air freight delivery of the items, and making individual
contact with inventory managers to hasten release of the item. In the
language of supply support, this is termed "expediting." Notice that the data in
Figure 11 are closely related to "all requisitions" which has a mean time to
release of 269.9 days and a standard deviation of 354.0 days. It is considerably
worse than "all priority 3 requisitions" which has figures of 215.8 and 316.8 days
respectively. The explanation for this is the FMS client chose to code its "hot"
requisitions in a manner inconsistent with U. S. practice. Therefore, while its
representatives in the U. S. understood the urgency of the requirement, the U.
S. supply system did not.
The normal practice in the U. S. Navy for coding urgent requirements
involves two steps. The first is to enter a "W" in the first position of the
document serial number, and "999" in the required delivery date. These entries
are universally understood to indicate an urgent requirement. The second step
is to send a message which indicates why the requisition is urgent, specifically
which system on the ship is out of commission, how reduced in capability the
ship is rendered, and other administrative matters. For a sovereign state to opt
to divulge such sensitive information on the readiness of its naval assets is not
easy. Most FMS navies are small, and if their ships are cited in "reduced
capability" messages-which owing to the long delivery times may be in effect
for many months-it becomes an open invitation to any neighboring state to
take military action against them.
Another problem resulting from the U. S. system's refusal to be
affected by personal expediting, as opposed to systematic expediting, is that of
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cultural differences. Some FMS clients are from cultures which stress personal
relationships as opposed to bureaucratic processes. For them to meet a
stonewall when trying to satisfy their most urgent needs could be interpreted
as an insult. Taken over a long period of time, it may mean for them that the
United States is in fact not interested in their welfare.
D. BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Just as Ulysses had to find a course to sail between the monster Scylla
and the whirlpool Charybdis, so does the FMS client have to negotiate a bal-
ance between unacceptably low operational availability at one extreme and fi-
nancial ruin at the other. What has been shown thus far is only the first evil:
low operational availability that results from long lead times. What remains to
be discussed is the "cure" for long lead times.
1. The Scylla of Low Operational Availability
Lead times are a problem for all supply systems. The Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs recorded testimony that procurement
lead times have grown, and cost the DoD $40 million per day [Ref. 24]. In
hearings before the House of Representatives on the proposed Security
Assistance Program for fiscal year 1988, the first "lesson" which has emerged
from the experience of client nations is that:
It is important for countries to recognize the full implications of
procurement leadtimes regardless of the acquisition channel-FMS or
commercial. Given limited U. S. production bases, contract competition
delays and special order requirements, it is necessary for countries to buy
adequate stocks of spares, munitions, and other consumables .... [Ref. 251
It is possible to overcome long delivery times and preserve
operational availability. What is necessary is to have larger stocks of goods on
hand to fill the much longer "pipeline." This buffers the customer (the ship)
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from the problems associated with getting wholesale stocks. As an illustration,
consider that a client might want to achieve an operational availability of 0.8.
Using the above equation for Ao, and assuming a baseline mean time between
failures of 5,000 hours and mean time to repair of 128 hours, then an average
mean supply response time of 1,122 hours is required to achieve Ao of 0.8.
Moreover, in a simplified system where there is only the U. S. supply system
and a single local supply system, the following structure would provide the
needed 1,122 hour goal as shown in Figure 12:
U. S. supplied stock (using Issue Group I & II average)
1,122 hour 5s 00 hor
80.7%9o Local stock (central warehouse and shipboard)
24 hours
Figure 12. A Possible Logistics Structure
Thus if the probability of having stock on hand is maintained at 80%, then Ao
can be held at 0.8.
The problem of being able to satisfy all requirements 80% of the time
can be broken down into a general equation. The driving elements of the
equation are the variability of demand and the variability of leadtimes. If, for
instance, one can be virtually certain that an item is required exactly every 365
days, then it has a low variability of demand. The demand is one annually and
the standard deviation of demand is zero. This is not the case, however.
Taking all line items individually, the mean annual demand is only 0.2.
This means that on average only one item is required every five years. The
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average standard deviation of demand is, however, 1.6 item years. Such high
variability is common for low usage items. While the items may be "low us-
age" for the FMS client, they may well be "high usage" and have lower vari-
ability for the U. S. system as a whole.
The second element in determining how many of an item to stock is
the procurement leadtime. The average procurement leadtime for all Issue
Group III (stock replenishment priority) requisitions is 0.859 years. The average
standard deviation is 0.986 years. Hence, on average one must wait for 313
days for replenishment, but to be 95% certain that enough time is scheduled for
an item to come in, one must calculate the mean (0.859 years) plus 1.645 times
the standard deviation. This totals 2.48 years. Obviously, the uncertainty of
delivery adds a large penalty to the overall wait.
An appendix contains the calculations which are summarized here.
The stockage levels which must be met to achieve 80% certainty of having
items on hand break down as 0.172 (demand) and 1.305 (safety stock). Thus at
the point 0.172 plus 1.305, the item must be reordered. This point, 1.477, is not
realistic, since the units are discrete and cannot be divided into thousandths.
Therefore, a choice must be made between one or two. If the level of one is
chosen, a lower than 80% availability rate results (71% in fact). If the level of two
is chosen, a higher rate results (89%).
The level of one, and its 71% probability of having stock on hand also
affects Ao. It falls to 0.736, and the probability of having five systems up
simultaneously falls to 22%. The level of two increases Ao to .866, and appears
to be the better choice.
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2. The Charybdis of Financial Ruin
Consider the cost of maintaining stockage levels at two when the
actual demand is only 0.2. The U. S. system, with much shorter leadtimes, can
support 19.4 times more demands with the same stockage level. It is quite
possible for the FMS client to have to carry more stock than the entire U. S.
system as a result of slow and uncertain replenishment. This is the Charybdis
of financial ruin.
The analogy of Scylla and Charybdis implies that there exists some
course which splits the dangers and is satisfactory. This may not be the case.
Security Assistance may result in both dangerously low A o and inordinately
high operating costs for our allies. We may be overcharging and virtually
disarming those who we need to help maintain the common defense.
E. THE COMPETITIVE STANCE OF FMS
The importance of FMS in maintaining our alliances and good relations
may be overstated. FMS as a percentage of arms transfers has fallen dramati-
cally [Ref. 26]. Moreover, it has become such an onerous financial burden on
our allies that:
The fiscal year 1990 security assistance request seeks authority to provide
all FMS financing on a non-repayable basis, to further increase the quality
of U. S. assistance and reduce the debt burden of military aid recipients.
[Ref. 27, p. 5]
Thus the pretense that FMS is "sold" to clients has been abandoned. Even at
the price of "free," it may not be a bargain if it cannot provide defensive capa-
bility, however. When one looks at the actual open market sales of U. S. arms,
reducing from them the give-aways, one sees a distinct pattern. Our arms
exports are concentrated in a limited area: aircraft. Taking all major arms
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transfers from October 1985 through May of 1987 that involved U. S.
corporations [Ref. 28], and breaking down the sales according to the
corporations' main export business [Ref. 29], Figure 13 results:
$1800.0 -
$1600.0 -.
$1400.0 - U Aircraft/Helo exporter






Millions Corporation by rank
Figure 13. Preponderence of Aircraft Sales
Clearly our sales are geared to aircraft. In other areas of arms production, such
as ships, we are not so competitive that other nations desire to use their own
cash to buy our products. Furthermore, the sales listed above only total $3.3
billion per year. Should the Japanese with the FSX and South Koreans with the
F/A-18 become competitors in the aircraft industry, our real arms exports
could become insignificantly small. Our arms industry, shielded by the "Buy
American" dictum and hounded by Congressional oversight (there are two
and one half times more "procurement oversight agents" than there are FBI
investigators) [Ref. 30] has become non-competitive.
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Money spent on weapons or supplies that are given to our allies can only
be viewed as an extension of our own defense expenditures. That "(a)ssisting
America's friends and allies to defend themselves [with FMS credits] is a highly
efficient use of resources" [Ref. 27, p. 41 must have a bearing in fact, and not be
mere rhetoric. Improvements to the FMS system must be made before
"efficiency" is attained.
1. Need for Improved Customer Relations
Supplying anything to a client requires concern for the client's needs.
We need to improve how we package logistic support so that the end users
can fully utilize our product. This includes having translations of all pertinent
technical data for the deck plate level technician to use. We currently school
technicians and supervisors in the use and maintenance of our systems. We
also provide customer liaison for each FMS client, but in a limited fashion. A
dedicated team available to be contacted during the client's normal working
hours would improve customer service. A change in law allowing FMS
repairable carcasses to be turned in on a one-for-one purchase would be an
essential improvement.
2. The Role of U. S. Logistic Support
The U. S. supply system has a top priority: to support U. S. forces.
As operating tempos have changed, and the funds available for purchasing
stocks of repair parts have risen and fallen, this task has been difficult. It is not
surprising that FMS clients have taken a back seat. However, it is doubly
wrong to deny the second-class treatment we have provided and pretend that
it is first rate. Moreover, it is dangerous to presume that our allies, outfitted
with our own equipment, are necessarily capable of operating with it as we
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could. If allied forces are to be an important stone in the wall of common de-
fense, it must be a solid stone and not paper mach6.
Maintaining high levels of operational capability of U. S. forces while
also providing support to FMS clients demands that trade-offs be made. FMS,
as a Department of State program, will probably never be given as high a
priority by the Department of Defense as supporting our own forces. It is not
clear that FMS ought to be given an equal ranking. What is evident, however,
is that certain administrative issues must be resolved. Specifically, repairable
carcasses from FMS clients must be easily reintroduced into the logistics
system. Further, orders from FMS clients must be given more consistent
treatment. Ideal, from the client's perspective, would be to be treated like any
other customer, i. e. be given stock even if doing so brings the stock level to or
below the reorder point. FMS clients are generally small, and have to rely
upon the supply system as an "intermediate" rather than a "wholesale" source.
It is not financially possible for them to absorb huge leadtimes with even
greater variability in leadtime delays. Like any customers whose needs are not
being met, they will look elsewhere. Although FMS might appear attractive,
being free of cost, it may also be free of benefits. National defense-anybody's
national defense-is a serious matter. A fancy race car that cannot run will win
no races. From the FMS client's perspective this is, indeed, a serious matter.
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V. THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT OF SECURITY
The new world order is characterized by a return to multipolar politics,
away from the bipolar arrangement of the Cold War era. While the Soviet
Union remains a potential threat to the United States, it no longer has an
empire of satellite states ready to do its bidding. The rest of the world, freed
from the polarizing East/West influence, is able to pursue its own interests.
Some of these interests are inimical to the United States. It is necessary to
explore where new conflicts may arise and gauge their potential significance.
A. TRIBALISM AND NUCLEAR TERROR
The New World Order is not without its pitfalls. Foremost among them is
the disturbing rise of tribalism. A tribe is a group of people characterized by
common ancestry, customs, leadership, etc. It is not necessarily a state, since
state status requires defined land, general government, and the capacity to en-
gage in relations with other states [Ref. 16, pp. 232-5]. Nevertheless, tribes exist
and have important effects upon international events.
A tribe is a social entity. It exists within one or more states and has its
own leadership and political agenda. Because it is by definition a "closed sod-
ety" it is unlikely to consider international issues in any context other than
immediate self interest. Its leadership is un-beholden to any established in-
ternational level of civilization, and is free to act as it chooses.
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1. Tribal Warfare
Tribal warfare, which is the concern, is most often unrestricted warfare.
Consider the differences between restricted and unrestricted warfare, and the
likelihood that tribal warfare will continue to be of the latter variety:
There is considerable ethnographic and ethnohistorical data which sug-
gests that unrestrictive war was widespread among tribal peoples.
Enemies tried to totally destroy each other.. .The victors killed as many
men as possible and killed or enslaved women and children. [Ref. 31, pp.
149-63]
Total war or absolute war is characterized by von Clausewitz as that common
element in all wars that is obscured by the checks placed upon it by reason
and civilization.
Therefore, if we find civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death,
do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence
exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on War, and has
taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts
of mere instinct. [Ref. 32]
War, to the western mind, is not a "rude act of mere instinct." It is a particular
form of political policy. The clear difference between tribal and civilized
warfare is essential to understand. The United States has not prepared its
forces or policy for anti-tribal warfare, but it must do so now.
2. Tribal Warfare in the Modem World
Well documented cases exist where tribes became armed with mod-
ern weapons and continued a policy of unrestrictive war with disastrous con-
sequences. One case, that of the Maori in New Zealand, serves to illustrate the
process.
As a people who relied upon temporary farms created by cutting
and burning, the Maori tribes constantly needed new land. To get this they
fought. The traditional unrestricted warfare fought with primitive weapons was
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mainly decided by numbers of warriors. With the introduction of firearms by
the Europeans, Maori warfare became totally destructive [Ref. 31, p. 1561. Mass
slaughters resulted when battles took place. So dangerous was the situation
that food production was ignored in favor of cash crop production in order to
buy more guns and ammunition.
After two decades of unrestrictive fighting, the decimated Maori
submerged their culture in favor of Christianity, "which provided them with a
set of new values which no longer sanctioned revenge for injuries suffered."
[Ref. 31, p. 158]
The essential points about the Maori case is that: 1) unrestricted
warfare is the case rather than the exception, 2) the introduction of modern
weapons did not change the pattern of warfare, and only made it more mur-
derous, and 3) the society had to be recast before the situation could be
changed.
A second case is the Mae Enga, an Australian tribe, that fought for
similar reasons as the Maori. However, the Australian government thoroughly
intervened in tribal warfare and mediated disputes. The impact was extremely
beneficial, as might be expected. The tribe has returned to warfare to settle
disputes because "(t)he litigation system has become cumbersome and time-
consuming. Fewer complaints than in the past are processed and the
determinations are more unsatisfactory to the litigants [Ref. 31, p. 156]." Thus,
the imposition of law and order can be effected, but only so long as it is
convincing and satisfactory to the tribe. When it becomes uncertain or unable
to essentially address the grievances, it ceases to exist, notwithstanding the fact
of the physical presence of its elements.
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Tribal warfare is not restricted to Stone Age aboriginal peoples. It is
the growing background of international conflicts. In Liberia thousands die. In
South Africa it threatens chaos. In Uzbekistan the finest Soviet soldiers are
required to quell it.
3. Terrorist Connection
The international terrorism of the past twenty years is an example of
tribal warfare. The groups which perpetrate terrorism are nothing other than
tribes. They have common ancestry, customs, and leadership. Their agendas
revolve around their own particular needs. One common need, since so many
of the groups are fundamental Islamic, is to free their people of the corruption
of western influence.
Just as the Maori found modern weapons to be useful, if devastating,
additions to their armories, fundamental Islamic "tribes" may find
thermonuclear weapons as attractive additions to their forces.
B. URANIUM FOR THE ARAB NATION
The following is a transcript of a Moscow "Vremya" newscast aired June
26,1990. [Ref. 331
Now about something else. Life is full of hazards. There are all kind of
signs to caution us against them. For instance: "Caution: High voltage!" or
"Danger!" But nowhere will you find a sign reading: "Caution:
Irresponsibility!" although we could well do with such a sign. This is il-
lustrated by the following report about phosphate fertilizer delivered to
our country from Syria.
Fertilizer containing uranium-238 began to arrive in April. There is
some 800 tonnes of it now. Approximately one-third was applied to the
soil back in April and early May....
Irresponsibility is the key word in the news report, but not for the reason the
correspondent imagined. Syria-along with a number of other Middle Eastern
and North African nations-now have the means to produce significant
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quantities of uranium. In the case of Syria, the responsibility for this fact lies at
the feet of the Soviet Union.
Other nations that have the ore reserves and the plants to separate ura-
nium are Jordan, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Should
these nations enter the "nuclear club," the balance of power in Europe and the
Mediterranean could be radically changed. The plants needed to strip
uranium have only recently been built in the area, and have been built with
alarming rapidity. [Refs. 38,39,40,41,42 and 43]
1. Uranium as a By -product
The mining of uranium ore as the exclusive means of acquiring the
element is no longer possible. World demand for uranium has outstripped the
availability of highly concentrated ores. However, as the Soviet Union pointed
out in 1960 [Ref. 34], vast quantities of uranium are available as the by-product
of other mining ventures. In South Africa where uranium is mined in
conjunction with gold, concentrations as low as 0.02% are economically
feasible to mine. Thus, even though 99.98% of the ore mass has no uranium, the
gold produced is profitable enough to allow secondary treatment of the ore to
isolate uranium. [Ref. 34, p. 18]
The use of low concentrate ores has grown steadily since the beginning of
the atomic age. The following Table 1, published in 1964, demonstrates the
shift from highly concentrated ore (where uranium is greater than 1 % of the
ore) to lower grade ores. Clearly lower grade ores are being used for the
production of uranium, but a bottom limit exists where the ore is not
economically viable to process. Galkin identifies the lower limit for economic
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viability as 0.05-0.07%.5 However, when the uranium is part of a phosphate
rock matrix, the limit cited is only 0.01-0.02%. [Ref. 35, p. 68].
TABLE 1. CONCENTRATION OF URANIUM ORES MINED [Ref. 35, p. 67]
Year above 1.0% 1-0.5% 0.1% or less
1948 100% 0% 0%
1953 70% 30% 0%
1958 5% 50% 45%
1962 2% 48% 50%
The actual lower limit is entirely dependent upon the process by which the
uranium is extracted, and the Soviet Union has been working for decades at
improving this technology.
Phosphate rock is a conglomeration of minerals, but the important
component is phosphorus, which is an essential element for agriculture.
Phosphorus is generally found in the form of the mineral apatite. Phosphate
rock can be crushed and combined with other important chemicals to form
fertilizer for agriculture. However, phosphate rock does not readily dissolve
and release its phosphorus. It is a "low tech" solution to creating fertilizer, and
suffers from very low phosphate rock prices owing to the high transportation
costs associated with moving it.
2. Chemistry of Extracting Uranium from Phosphate Deposits
The chemical step necessary to improve phosphate rock is to extract
from it phosphorus in the form of phosphoric acid. This can be seen in the
5 The concentration "0.05%" can alternately be expressed as 0.0005 or 500 parts-
per-million (PPM). All three forms are used in the text.
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chemical reaction:
Ca5(PO4)3 • F(CI) + H2SO4 -4 3H3PO4 + 5CaSO45 + HF(HCl)
Translated into English, this means that: phosphate rock-here specifically
apatite [Ca5(PO4)3 • F(Cl)] combined with sulfuric acid (H2S04) becomes ortho-
phosphoric acid (H3P04) plus gypsum (CaSO4) which precipitates out as a
solid, plus hydrofluoric or hydrochloric acid [HF(HC1)I, depending on if fluorine
or chlorine is found in the particular apatite molecule.
Dispersed in the phosphate rock is uranium dioxide, which like the
phosphoric acid, is dissolved in the leaching process. The uranium is then
captured by an organic agent, and separated out as pure fluorine salt, UF4.
[Ref. 35, p. 121]
This process is very important to the production of uranium:
The extraction of uranium from phosphate rock, as a by-product of
phosphate fertilizer manufacturing, is one of the most im ortant prob-
lems in the manufacture of uranium. The profitability ofPtis process,
despite the low content of uranium, is due to the enormous volume of
phosphate rock which is processed to fertilizers. The total amount of
uramum in phosphate rock is very large, and it is probable that after the
deposits of rich uranium ores are exhausted, phosphate rock, together
with shale and carbonaceous ores, will become the most important
source of uranium. [Ref. 35, p. 119]
The Soviet Union very early set its eyes on phosphate rich countries because
"the deposits in Morocco alone contain about three million tons6 of uranium
[Ref. 34, p. 28]." To put this figure into perspective, "in the late 1970's, the
non-Communist countries had a total of about 1.8 million tons of uranium ore
[sic] that could be mined." [Ref. 361
In addition to developing terrestrial phosphate deposits, the Soviet Union
also set about exploring the phosphate deposits under the oceans.
6AIl references to "tons" are metric tons unless otherwise stated.
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These deposits were found to be deficient in uranium content, because of the
tendency of uranium salts to leach out into sea water [Ref. 371. Consequently,
the terrestrial mining of phosphates for uranium appears to be the most
important means.
3. Phosphate Production
Countries of the region with significant phosphate rock deposits are
included in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2. MIDDLE EAST/ NORTH AFRICAN PHOSPHATE
PRODUCTION
State Millions of tons Comments
Morocco 56,000 ranks 3rd in world production [Ref. 38, p. 612]
Iraq 7,500 [Ref. 38, p. 4601
Egypt 1,000 high uranium content [Ref. 39, p. 270, 3851
Jordan 945 ranks 5th in world production [Ref. 39, p. 5291
Syria 830 [Ref. 40, p. 1011]
Tunisia 300 found 1985 plus other large reserves [Ref. 38, p. 858]
Algeria 300 [Ref. 41, p. 48]
Israel (unavailable) ranks 8th in world production
These eight nations actively mine and process phosphate rock into phosphoric
acid. The means to do this has grown enormously in the past decade.
Previously most of the production was in the form of crushed phosphate rock.
The capacities and production rates for these states are listed in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. PHOSPHORIC ACID PRODUCTION 7
State Annual Capacity Production (1987) Developed
in thousands of tons in thousands of tons
Morocco 1,320 604 1987
Iraq 600 130 1980
Jordan 850 565 1981
Egypt 440 100 1986
376 193 1983
Tunisia 760 572 1986
Algeria 505 (none) 1981-6
Israel 120 120 1981
The tendency to move from phosphate rock export to phosphoric
acid production is readily evident. The interest in this change may be eco-
nomic, since phosphate rock is valued in the range of $25-50 per ton, while
phosphoric acid may bring $300 per ton. However, the cost of processing the
rock may be high.
In the case of Jordan, it is reported that the costs of processing phos-
phate rock was reduced by $50 per ton to $200 [Ref. 38, p. 530]. During this pe-
riod phosphoric acid marketed for between $230-250 per ton [Ref. 38, p. 18].
Even if the value of the ore is neglected, which was for Jordanian ore at the
time $36 per ton, the profit margin on producing phosphoric acid appears
rather low for the interest being placed in building new capacity.
In 1987 Jordan entered a joint development project for new phos-
phoric acid capacity with India and USSR. If uranium is the source of the in-
terest, as opposed to phosphoric acid, the interest can be understood.
7 Sources of data from Minerals Yearbooks (op cite) and The Middle East and
North Africa 1989. Figures are approximate, as year-to-year figures tend to not
follow from volume to volume. In one instance, the importation of uranium by
Libya from Niger is cited under Libya as 425 tons, but under Niger as 1,212
tons.
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Since, with the exception of Israel, none of these nations would be
expected to have the technical capability to design and operate uranium-ex-
traction phosphate operations, it is interesting to note who is helping whom.
For Morocco the interested parties are China, India, and Saudi Arabia (China
and Saudi Arabia are to get their own plants using Moroccan feedstocks). Iraq
received Japanese assistance in reconstructing its plants. Jordan, as has been
noted, is working with India and the Soviet Union. Egypt recently received an
offer from the Soviet Union for assistance in building five reactors and a fuel
processing facility [Ref. 42, p. 391], although its recent large phosphate rock
deposits have yet to be developed. Syria has been developed by the Soviet
Union. Tunisia received technical assistance from the U. S. and Brazil, and
financial support from Kuwait. Algeria purchased a turn-key plant from
France, but has not been able to operate it because of technical difficulties.
These countries recognize the fact their mineral deposits include
uranium. "Quantities of uranium and vandium are now known to be mixed in
with the phosphate reserves" in Jordan [Ref. 42, p. 5501. Tunisia "has post-
poned plans to exploit the country's uranium deposits until the world market
improves [Ref. 42, p. 834]." In Syria "there has long been talk of a nuclear power
plant, possibly using uranium obtained from local phosphate deposits [Ref. 42,
p. 804]." Egypt estimated the uranium content of one of its phosphate deposits
at 100,000 tons, and has mined ore as uranium, as opposed to a by-product,
since 1980 with a production rate of 100 tons per year [Ref. 43].
Despite the public admission of the potential of these nations to
mine uranium, and the fact that all of them have updated their phosphoric acid
production facilities within the past few years, none openly discusses the topic.
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The reason behind their reluctance to admit any uranium related enterprise is
undoubtedly fear of invoking a reaction from Israel. Iraq openly developed a
plutonium production facility, and saw it destroyed by Israel.
For Iraq to lose its reactor did not devastate its economy. For a na-
tion like Morocco,Tunisia, or Jordan to lose its presumed uranium processing
facilities would be another matter entirely. Uranium, when produced as a by-
product, is done as a part of an expensive phosphoric acid/fertilizer complex.
Should such a complex be destroyed, along with it would go the basis of these
nations' economies. Bluntly put, phosphates are the life of these oil poor
nations.
4. The Economy of Enriched Uranium Production
[We estimate] the value of uranium-235 (in uranium enriched to
about 3 percent in uranium-235) to be used for fuel in the world's nuclear
power plants during the next decade is about $38,000 per
kilogram....Unenriched uranium [is valued at] $66 per kilogram. [Ref. 44, p.
2491
Uranium is a valuable commodity. In the next decades as petroleum
becomes less available and nuclear power more reliable, uranium may be the
fuel of choice. There is no doubt that much of it will come from phosphate
deposits. Its production is therefore a legitimate undertaking. The scale of the
potential sales is startlingly high. Using the least optimistic concentration of
uranium in phosphates, 100 parts per million [Ref. 45] (which is ten to fifty times
lower than Soviet estimates [Ref. 35, p. 72]), Morocco has potential annual sales
slightly in excess of $1.0 billion, Jordan $644 million, Tunisia $576 million, Iraq
$455 million, Syria $285 million, Egypt $333 million, and Algeria $383 million.
These figures reflect current capacity to process phosphate rock, the assumed
concentration of uranium, the loss of 80% of the uranium during processing to
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enriched uranium, multiplied by the current stated value for enriched uranium.
It does not include the loss of 35% of uranium during phosphoric acid
production which is indicated by the Soviet literature because the techniques
listed are over thirty years old, and have been "continually improved."
If the Soviet estimate of the concentration of uranium is used, this
potential $3.7 billion industry is up-scaled to $37-185 billion. The world's crude
oil market, using $20 per barrel and 1987 production [Ref. 38, p. 41), is valued at
$409 billion. As the supplies of oil are depleted and the market for nuclear
power increases, uranium will experience greater demand. The price for a
kilogram of enriched uranium would likely rise, especially if it is managed by a
cartel of Uranium Producing and Exporting Countries. The list of countries
that produce phosphates includes, beyond those already discussed, Brazil,
United States, USSR, China, Togo, and the Republic of South Africa. Therefore
non-Arab exporters would probably include only Togo and Brazil, with the
other nations using their own stocks to satisfy domestic demand.
Such an idea, that some new energy cartel could arise, is undercut by
the huge stockpiles of highly enriched (93 to 94% U23 5) uranium which exist in
the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States has 500 tons of
highly enriched uranium in its weapons stockpiles, the the Soviet Union has an
estimated 400-800 tons [Ref. 44, p. 2271. Since the nuclear power plants
throughout the world in 1988 consumed 297 tons of U235 , this would supply
the civilian market for three or four years. Since the annual world production
of U235 (1987 figures) totaled only 262 tons [Ref. 38, p. 81, an apparent shortfall in
production exists. This shortfall is anticipated to grow in the next ten years as
nuclear power plant consumption is anticipated to rise to 460 tons of U2 3 5
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[Ref. 44, p. 230]. Action to dismantle weapons and utilize the U 2 3 5 in power
stations is by no means assured. Without doing so, however, the market
dynamics to support a new energy cartel could arise.
Using the present phosphoric acid production capacity, and a ura-
nium content of 0.0001, the total expected U 2 3 5 is only 35 tons per year.
Therefore, unless a much greater capacity is generated, the northern Africa
nations cannot be expected to dominate the market. Since total uranium
mining has not expanded to keep pace with demand, there is a strong indica-
tion that in the future, those who use nuclear power will have to pay higher and
higher rates for fuel. If this is the case, then the phosphate/uranium producers
will merely benefit from expanded margins. It is unclear just how far they can
expand phosphoric acid production, since it is the primary product and must
have a market in order to justify producing uranium. The world is currently
consuming 34.8 million metric tons of phosphatic fertilizer per year [Ref. 38, p.
211. At present they have the capacity to run approximately 10% of this market
through their phosphate plants. Since there are other producers of
phosphates, it is likely that at best they could double or triple production.
The dynamics of an as yet unborn enriched uranium market are
merely speculative. Using uranium for electrical power generation is rational
and responsible. Other uses for uranium exist, and unfortunately the use of
uranium for atomic weapons must be considered.
5. Enriching Uranium
Uranium as it comes from the earth is not particularly useful. The
element is comprised of three natural isotopes. The lightest, U 2 3 4 , is the most
rare and comprises only 0.0058% of the element. The next, U 2 3 5 is rare,
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comprising 0.71% of uranium, and is the only natural source of fissionable fuel.
U238 constitutes the bulk: 99.28% [Ref. 46]. In order for fission to take place, the
portion of U2 35 in the fuel must be increased. This process is called
enrichment.
The level of enrichment necessary for nuclear power plant fuel is on
the order of one to three percent. The Soviet Union uses very low enriched
fuel for its graphite reactors, the type which became infamous as a result of the
accident at Chernobyl. Other types of reactors generally use three percent
enriched fuel.
a. Gaseous diffusion technique
The methods available to enrich uranium are three. The first
and oldest technology is gas diffusion. This requires the uranium to be made
into a gaseous compound called uranium hexafluoride (UF6) which is diffused
through membranes so as to separate the desired U235 from U238 . It is a very
cumbersome process, and necessitates huge buildings to contain the
equipment [Ref. 44, p. 201]. This is the technology the United States used to
produce enriched uranium, which it discontinued in 1964 owing to the large
stock of enriched uranium that it had accumulated. It did not, however,
discontinue producing fissionable plutonium, which, owing to its advantage of
requiring less material to create a critical mass, became preferred.
b. Gas centrifuge technique
The second method of enriching uranium is with a series of gas
centrifuges. This technology is somewhat less dated and less bulky. It requires
transforming the uranium into the gaseous uranium hexafluoride and passing it
into tanks which spin the gas and separate the lighter U235 . It is also reported
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to be a "detectable" method of enrichment, owing to the large buildings and
equipment involved. [Ref. 44, p. 2011
c. Laser isotope separation technique
The most recent technology for producing U235 is called laser
isotope separation. Basically, one laser excites the atoms of U235 and
prepares it to be ionized by a second laser. The ionized U23 5 is electrostaticly
collected. During this process the U238 is left behind, unexcited, unionized.
The most disturbing aspect of this technology is that very highly enriched ura-
nium, also called weapons grade uranium, may be produced in a single step.
The most economical method of producing 3% enriched stock would be to
completely deplete a portion of the uranium, take the resulting U235 and
combine it with the balance to achieve 3% enrichment. Metallic uranium is pre-
sumably used in the process, which is much less difficult to achieve than
uranium hexafluoride. The phosphate ore process produces the solid uranium
tetrafluoride which can be reduced to metallic uranium by using calcium. [Ref.
35, p. 3881
The laser isotope method was developed in the United States
by Lawrence Livermore Laboratories and Jersey Nuclear-Avco Corporation
[Ref. 47]. It was quietly absorbed into the classified Livermore Labs, and is pre-
sumed to be classified. However the technology has been made public.
In the Physics of Quantum Electronics, Volume 4: Laser
Photochemistry, Tunable Lasers, and Other Topics, [Ref. 48] a complete description
of the research is provided, detailing exact frequencies of light used and
equipment required. Although some difficulties may remain for a nation that
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desires to set up industrial production of highly enriched uranium, the
published work provides an excellent basis for doing so.
One author states, "Detection of operation could be accom-
plished by reliance on the distinctive electromagnetic signature of a [laser en-
richment] plant resulting from the pulsed operation of the lasers, flash lamps,
and other items [Ref. 44, p. 325]. If production of enriched uranium is accom-
plished underground, however, it is doubtful that the electronic emissions
would be detectable.
C. POLITICS OF URANIUM
The value of a kilogram of highly enriched uranium undoubtedly is higher
on the black market than in the open market. According to sources, only 25
kilograms are required to produce a nuclear weapon [Ref. 44, P. 306]. Such
"highly enriched" uranium contains about 93.5% U 2 3 5 [Ref. 44, p. 289]. In order
to produce such a quantity, 3,300 kilograms of "natural uranium" is required.
Using a presumed concentration of uranium in phosphate ore of 0.0001, 3,300
tons of ore must be processed. This much ore could be processed in less than
a week by any of these nations, and in less than a day by Morocco.
If any of these nations has a political agenda that requires moving into the
"nuclear club," and the money necessary to buy technical expertise and
equipment to enrich the uranium, then the possibility of proliferation cannot
be discounted. Of greatest concern are Jordan and Syria. A miniature Cold
War with chronically unstable players is highly undesirable.
The southern flank of Europe is an area that could have provided the
Cold War Soviet Union with an opportunity to destabilize Europe. As has
been seen, the Soviet Union published valuable documentation over thirty
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years ago that encouraged proliferation of nuclear development. Although
this is not in itself tantamount to proliferation of nuclear weapons, it does
indicate an "open-mindedness" that comes very close. Looking at the list of
nations, their anti.-Western orientation, locations primarily along the southern
shore of the Mediterranean, and common fundamental Muslim character, one
must consider whether the Soviet Union-especially in years past when it was
attempting to make allies in the region-created the situation where the balance
of forces against the West would naturally degenerate as these nations moved
into the "nuclear club."
D. AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
Phosphoric acid production involves tons of powerful chemicals which
liberate massive quantities of hydrofluoric and hydrochloric acids. Consider
the basic equation whereby apatite is reduced to phosphoric acid:
Ca5(PO4)3 • F(Cl) + H2SO4 --- 3H3PO4 + 5CaSO4, + HF(HC1)
Because the ore which is used for this is impure-which is often a reason for
using the process to begin with-many other chemicals are present. Phosphate
rock is created by the deposit of sea salts, and includes carbon contamination.
Therefore it is possible to consider as a by-product of the phosphoric acid
reaction the following:
C4 + + F + 3C - CFC13 which is freon F-11, and
C4 + + 2F- + 2C- -+ CF2C12 which is freon F-12
The acid leaching process creates a soup of chemicals which vary not
only with the ore being leached, but within the mass depending upon local
chemical composition. If significant quantities of fluorocarbons are generated
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by the phosphoric acid process, the danger to the earth's ozone is much
greater than had been realized. Millions of tons of reactants are annually pro-
cessed in the open air. If the presence of hydrofluoric and hydrochloric acid is
not enough of a concern, the additional production of odorless colorless freon,
which could easily go unnoticed, is more disturbing.
When fluorine is released from apatite, 10% reacts with the gypsum, 60%
remains in solution, and 30% volatilizes [Ref. 49]. Since fluorine is one of the
most active of all chemicals, it is likely to react with whatever is at hand. It is
probable that the fluorine escapes in the form of hydrofluoric acid, which is
lighter than air. However, the fact that hydrofluoric acid is so highly soluble in
water-infinitely so in cold water, and very soluble in hot water [Ref. 46, p. B-
1811-raises a question as to just what form the volatilizing fluorine actually
has. If in fact it is some other inert form, such as freon, it is easier to
comprehend how 30% of it escapes.
Chlorine is also likely to take the form of hydrochloric acid. This acid is
not lighter than air, and so would not float up into the atmosphere as readily as
hydrofluoric acid. No reference cited how the chlorine in apatite is distributed
in the final products. Like hydrofluoric acid, it is a gas at room temperature, but
it is much less soluble. Obviously, it forms a component of freon.
Several chemists were approached by the author with this concern. The
view of a chemist familiar with phosphate rock acid-reduction, Dr. Kinney of
the Naval Postgraduate School [Ref. 50] is that he does not believe the condi-
tions would be appropriate for the production of freon. He was not, however,
aware of any testing at phosphate plants for the presence of freons.
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Dr. Jarvis Moyers of the National Science Foundation, Atmospheric
Sciences Center in Washington, D. C., was also contacted by the author. Dr.
Moyers sees the problem in a different light. He believes the production of
quantities of airborne hydrofluoric and hydrochloric acids is primarily a local
phenomenon. The acids would rise into the atmosphere only until they meet
water molecules which would absorb them before they could reach the upper
atmosphere and contribute to the depletion of ozone. The acidified water
would then be scrubbed out of the atmosphere as rain.
This could cause a "severe local problem" but would likely not be a global
concern. The author volunteered some of the locations where phosphoric acid
production is occurring-along the northern Sahara in Africa and in the
Middle East-and questioned whether rainfall in such an arid region would
serve to scrub the acids out of the atmosphere. Dr. Moyers maintained that
rainfall would probably cleanse the atmosphere of these pollutants. He was
aware of no research on the issues of freon and air pollution resultant to
phosphoric acid production. [Ref. 51]
Dr. Russell L. Elsberry of the Department of Meteorology of Naval
Postgraduate School was approached with the question of whether airborne
hydrofluoric and hydrochloric acids could reach the upper atmosphere if
produced in the region under discussion. His opinion was that it is highly
likely, owing to the meteorology of the region. The Sahara generates a large
stabile air mass that is churned and mixed by the heat of the desert. This air
mass extends high up in the atmosphere, and is capable of suspending desert
particulate matter, much less hydrochloric acid molecules. The mass also
extends westward over the Atlantic Ocean, occasionally as far as the
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Caribbean. At times the Sahara air mass meets with tropical conditions that
actually injects it into the lower stratosphere-the region of the atmosphere
where ozone depletion occurs. Therefore, global consequences exist as a
result of the new capacity of these nations to produce phosphoric acid. [Ref.
52]
A Sierra Club representative for environmental affairs, Mr. Arthur
Mitteldorf, expressed interest and concen in this matter, and requested a copy
of this research be forwarded to the Director of Conservation for the Sierra
Club.
International oversight of phosphoric acid production facilities for the
observation of fluorine and chlorine compounds is indicated. Additionally, the
observers might test for di-(2-ethyl-hexyl)-phosphoric acid (EHPA) and
kerosene. EHPA is the agent used to remove uranium from the phosphoric
acid liquor, and it is diluted in kerosene to a 3% solution. The presence of
EHPA would indicate the plant is actively being used to produce uranium as a
by-product. [Ref. 35, p. 1811
Acid leaching of phosphate ores can be accomplished without any build-
ings, dispensing of sulfuric acid, or noticeable equipment. Because the ore
usually contains some sulfides, it can be "in-pile" leached.
The ore is arranged in large piles and wetted by rain and/or water. The
acid required to leach the uranium is formed by gradual oxidization of
sulfides which are already present in the ore or are specially added. The
percolated solution is run in special gutters into a container and thence to
further processing. The extraction of uranium into solution is between 60
and 80%. [Ref. 35, p. 1241
Such a primitive technology is required, according to Galkin, to make ores with
concentration of uranium of 0.0001 to 0.0003 economically profitable to
process. For an observer, it requires that fresh ore be found to analyze its
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uranium content to compare it with the plant's output. If a large drop in
uranium content is noted, the plant is being used to produce uranium.
International oversight is important. Freon production may be a chimera,
but if it gains access to determine if these nations are producing uranium, it is a
useful pretext. If freon is indeed being produced, the rapid growth of the
industry in the past five years may be a primary factor causing the ozone in the
atmosphere to be irreversibly reduced unless quick action is taken. Although
some respectable academics do not believe this is the case, in the absence of
any hard research it is impossible and imprudent to ignore the problem.
E. REGIONAL CONCERNS
Recent interest has arisen in Europe regarding the nations which could be
producing atomic weapons.
After the Islamic Salvation Front won a majority in local elections in
Algeria last month, there was also new fear in France and other southern
European countries that Islamic fundamentalism could begin to destabi-
lize Muslim countries that for many years have had political stability. [Ref.
53]
"(T)he southern rim of the Mediterranean could emerge as the greatest single
threat to Western Europe's security," the article concludes. The reasons for the
threat are many. Expanding populations with demographic youth bulges,
declining economies, and increasing fundamentalism are sources of trouble.
Religious factions can often be controlled by non-political figures. As a result
sub-factionalism can occur, and tribalism is the end result. Distinct geographi-
cal nations become blurred, and rational interaction between states is made
increasingly less likely.
The Mediterranean provides a permeable barrier to the potential conflict,
but it is in itself an essential line of communication for not only Europe, but all
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of the world. Primitive atomic weapons housed in rusty coastal freighters,
rather than modern missiles, could present an unequalled threat to the
American Sixth Fleet. Armed with modern weapons and unfettered by
Western notions of restraint and subjugation of warfare to politics, these forces
could at the very least landlock Italy, Greece, and Turkey. It is a situation which
requires attention. The spark which could set off the blaze would likely come
from social problems, not political maneuvers. The perceived threat of
American "cultural imperialism" could focus the attack on our forces.
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VI. PROPOSED STRUCTURES FOR UNILATERAL DEFENSE
A. THE UNILATERAL OPTION
One of the most basic options for national security strategy is to either
stand alone, independent, and unfettered by allies or to enter into some
multilateral arrangement. The future of the former option-unilateral
defense-is the topic at hand. The United States has in recent decades relied
upon partnerships for defense. In the Atlantic/European region our partners
are the other fifteen nations in NATO. In the Far East our partners are less
dearly defined, but are no less important.
As the New World Order takes shape, the likelihood of finding our pre-
vious partnerships continuing unchanged is very low. One solution to this is to
dilemma is to plunge into international defense as discussed in the next
chapter. The opposite solution is to undertake the task alone.
The main hurdle confronting the United States in the project of creating a
structure to support unilateral defense is to creating forward basing structures
from which to carry the fight.
B. SELF-SUFFICIENT BASING
A world power that acts without allies faces a serious problem when
overseas basing i, required. In the past the United States has relied upon
allies and has leased access to their sovereign soil for the purpose of creating
and maintaining forward bases. This option is becoming more expensive both
in terms of dollars paid and political costs. A solution to this dilemma is
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proposed in a Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory Technical Report [Ref. 541.
The name of the solution is the Modularized Ocean Basing System.
1. Modularized Ocean Basing System: MOBS
A solution to the problem of not having bases on foreign soil is the











Simplified rendering of a typical module.
Figure 15. Illustration of a Typical Module
typical module. The modular building blocks of such a base are described as
300 by 300 foot units set atop hollow vertical columns which are in turn
attached to horizontal cylinders. With a large number of modules--the report
specifies 132, enough to place four abreast in a column 33 modules long-a
9,900 foot runway can be constructed. Such a runway is required for C-5 and
C-17 aircraft to land and discharge cargo. Below the top "flight deck" would be
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two more decks for stowage, support, and berthing. The mobile base would
contain in excess of 1.25 square miles of deck space.
The draft of the units would be about 200 feet, and the freeboard is
designed to be 60 feet so as to prevent waves from reaching the top deck and
interfering with flight operations. The material from which the modules would
be created is prestressed concrete. This is concrete poured over cables which
are drawn very taut prior to when the concrete sets, which provides a very
strong final product. The technology of prestressed concrete is well
developed, as is the construction of semi-submersible o :an platforms.
2. Feasibility of MOBS
There is no technical reason to reject a modularized ocean basing
system. The individual platforms can be built and towed about the ocean. The
adequacy of the system to actually provide a safe runway for cargo planes is
not yet established, however. Since the modules would be semi-rigidly
networked, one would expect the sea swell would raise and lower them, in turn
producing the rippling effect visible on the main deck of a Great Lakes
freighter. The effect could be duplicated on land by constructing a landing
strip with a series of rises across its length. On such a runway the effects on the
undercarriage of a fully loaded C-5 could be tested to determine if it could
safely withstand the dynamic forces generated by the impacts with the crests
as it takes off and lands.
There are other considerations than the technical merits, of course.
The first is the strategic value of MOBS. Since the report tests this essential
variable by analyzing a scenario which begins with the MOBS units staged in
Okinawa, one must ask if MOBS is a general solution or a special solution
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aimed at replacing the Philippines and Diego Garcia. Staging a mobile system
at a forward base in order to cut down the time required to deploy it makes
one question its actual strategic value.
Okinawa is not a large island. It has only 554 square miles of territory
and a limited amount of surrounding water that is of the required depth (one
assumes around 50-80 fathoms) for anchoring the modules while awaiting
mobilization orders. If the 132 modules are individually anchored to prevent
abrasive wear during storage, with a 5:1 scope to the anchor chains, the nest of
modules would be over five miles across and range over at least 16 square
miles. This would be a rather significant imposition, and one which the
Japanese might balk at accepting.
Since the modules would be a strategic asset of the United States, it
is inconceivable that they be left out of range of supervision, subject to sabo-
tage by enemies. Therefore they must be stored in the vicinity of a military
base. Withdrawing the modules from Okinawa and stationing them near our
own coastline in California could precipitate a violent environmental outcry.
However, the Guamanians or Hawaiians might accept them.
Cost, however, is the primary driver in determining feasibility of the
MOBS concept. The report calculates the cost of a single facility would "not
exceed the projected year 2000 cost for leasing and access rights" of all our
foreign bases combined: $7.5 to $11 billion. The total cost of providing such
basing around the world, which includes much more than just one for use in




The political costs of entering into multilateral defensive arrangements
are not inconsequential. The national interests of the United States are con-
stantly in danger of being compromised when consensus among allies is
required. However, the strategic and fiscal costs of attempting to maintain a
unilateral military structure are even greater. Trying to construct overseas
bases on an as-needed basis slows our ability to respond. Ultimately, it is the




Multinational defensive arrangements have played an important
part in the design of U. S. strategic defense in the past. This was owing to the
existence of a set of common threats in WWII and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. Without a "common enemy" it is difficult to find a reasonable basis
for multinational defense without going a bit further afield. An arrangement
which allows an arm's length relationship with the imperfect sovereign rulers of
foreign states is much preferred to open alliances. Just such an arrangement is
possible through the development of United Nations garrison port complexes.
A. UNITED NATIONS GARRISON PORT COMPLEXES
A garrison of selected forces stationed at a deep water port complex is a
form of defense in being that could guarantee peace. Such forces, established
by the United Nations and manned by a spectrum of soldiers, sailors, and
airmen would have little "political baggage" to hinder them in moving against
aggression within their sphere of action.
If the UN is to become the central conduit for military action in the world,
a development which has many positive attributes, it must have locations from
which to rapidly deploy forces. Establishing permanent UN garrison ports is a
reasonable solution to this problem. Many potential problems can be
resolved by the mere presence of such facilities if they are well sited.
Three vital narrows exist that are of general interest to mankind. These
narrows are in Panama at the canal, in Suez, and in the Straits of Malacca. With
significant permanent military presence in these three locales, the free
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movement of ships and goods could be guaranteed from local or regional
strife.
In addition to key choke points, several other locations for garrison port
complexes would be necessary. Locations such as Charleston, S. C., and
Portsmouth, England, could provide coverage of the Atlantic basin. Darwin,
Australia, and Hawaii could provide defense of the Pacific Basin. The Indian
Ocean, flanked by Suez and Malacca, would only require a force in Diego Gar-
cia to ensure a prompt military reaction capability to aggression in the region.
Thus a total of eight garrison ports could provide significant protection to
the world's population. Of these eight locations, six already are developed and
are in the hands of either natural allies or the United States. The remaining
two, Malaccan Straits and Suez, would have to be developed. Such
development must include housing for home ported personnel, training
facilities, and repair facilities.
If each garrison port were outfitted with a fighting force consisting of: a
carrier battle group, a cruiser/battleship group, an amphibious attack force, a
mechanized army division, a light/marine division, a bomber wing, several
tactical strike wings, and a special operations force, then an immediate and
convincing counterforce to any local problem could be rapidly brought to
bear. Although such a list of forces, especially multiplied by eight locations,
appears rather large, it is not when compared to the forces presently under
arms in the world.
B. CREATION OF AN INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE
Multinational attack squadrons, flying stealth aircraft, stationed from
forward land bases and aboard aircraft carriers would meet with
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comparatively little political and virtually no effective military resistance. The
potential to severely curtail local military violence is very high.
Ships, presumably owned by individual nations and posted to the U. N.
force, would have to be back-fitted at the garrison port facilities with common
equipment for data link, communications, and other technical items. Aircraft
and ground equipment must be of a common type within each garrison, if not
across the board. Training and tactics would also have to be common.
Moreover, the officer corps and troops would have to be completely
integrated so as to avoid any internal divisions.
The problems of language and culture cannot be avoided. However, by
making the force a professional one, with advancement from within and a
common esprit de corps, problems would be minimized. It would be possible
to be highly selective when choosing members for the force, since the general
population of military forces in the world would probably be contracting.
The more varied and demanding the training regime for the forces, the
better. By appearing in all corners of the world and showing itself to be
formidable, an appearance of invulnerability could be achieved. Such a
belief-by the troops as well as the local populations-would serve as
deterrence to aggression. It is impossible to achieve this "on the cheap."
Funding must be adequate to afford proper outfitting and training.
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL
No United Nations force can escape the initial reaction that it would be
slow to act. The necessity of decisive action is the single best reason to
maintain unilateral power. However, a multinational garrison port need not be
hamstrung by the political inertia of the entire United Nations. The local police
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chief does not await the instructions of the city council to do his work. Nor
does the military wait for Congress to come to a conclusive frame of mind
before moving forces. The commander of a garrison port complex, in charge
of a "world precinct," should have the autonomy of action to do as he sees fit
in defense of clearly established objectives.
A concern arises that the commander of a garrison port complex, with the
best equipped and trained military force in the region, could entertain visions
of personal conquest. This situation could occur. To prevent it, the system of
rotating personnel from base to base and from job to job, preventing any
personal attachment of troops to a single leader, is essential. Another idea
which is practiced in some nations, is to retire the commanding officers upon
completion of their command tour, to discourage them from creating a
personal power base. The military must remain subservient to the political
leadership, and not form a viable alternative.
The national interests of the United States serve as an excellent point of
reference when considering how to empower the commander of a garrison
port complex. First, any aggression by a nation against the world at large or
any neighboring state must be countered. Second, private property, insofar as
it falls into the international arena, must be defended. These are clear enough
objectives. The defense of man from tyranny or organizational oppression is
not as clear, and would best be left to the decision of a general assembly to
determine if the internal order of a nation ought to be attacked and replaced.
The final objective, to encourage free speech and press and open societies,
would be served by the membership of individuals within the multinational
fc -e and the pervasive presence of the force throughout the world.
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D. NATIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES
By placing significant quantities of United States forces under a
multinational command, the specific national interests of the U. S. would be
ignored in favor of general interests. This is a bone which sticks in the craw of
those who feel there is a necessary conflict of the United States and the rest of
the world, and that control over U. S. forces must never be relinquished. This is
the result of a confusion between conflict between our national objectives,
where there is none, and conflict within the marketplace, where there is a great
deal.
The United States fights constantly and consistently for free trade. This is
not a policy that seeks to protect our citizens or avoid the natural conflicts of
the marketplace. The marketplace is where labor, energy, and capital are
exchanged. When a home buyer in San Diego takes out a $500,000 mortgage at
11% interest, he is in reality bidding against other borrowers for the capital. A
competing bidder may be a third-world industrialist who would build a factory
and employ hundreds of employees. A basic conflict exists between the two,
although they would never meet each other. Similarly, energy supplies are
regulated by a market mechanism, going to whomever finds the greatest
economy from the use of the energy. More complex structures such as
manufacturing plants and markets for the created goods are similarly driven by
market forces.
It is easy to see the conflicts generated in the market place as a source of
national interests that must be defended. Except for maintaining the market
place itself, which is to say free access to bid on resources, there is no military
role whatsoever. The only way a military commander can secure a "national
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interest" such as cheap minerals is to invade and colonize a state. This would
be an illegitimate use of military power, and ought to be defended against-
not prepared for accomplishment.
The areas where some conflict may arise, such as establishing the point
where a single person's rights end and society's begin, are real. The example of
how to recompense society for profits from deep sea minerals is an example.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand that some risk is entailed in sub-
ordinating national interpretations of "what is right" to multinational groups.
This risk has to be compared to the benefits that will accrue from the
multinational structure. One significant aspect of the equation is the
opportunity cost of trying to do defense "on our own." A multinational
defense force which protects all international commerce could logically pay for
itself by means of a uniform tariff on all international trade. No national force
could hope to impose such a tax. In concept it is very similar to pooling risk,
which insurance companies do, to reduce the cost for all participants.
E. THE PROBLEM OF CREATING MONOPOLISTIC DEFENSE FORCE
Given that a multinational force could be effective and well received, it
would become a monopoly providing a public good. It is very difficult to
calculate the "right amount" of a public good to produce, and even more
difficult to efficiently price the good. Therefore, the defense force could grow
beyond the optimum size, and provide a superabundance of "peace" at an
inefficient cost, since other goods would have to be sacrificed to acquire it.
This problem would occur to a number of people. Some would immedi-
ately attempt to cut back the forces until it is clearly evident that there is a
shortage of defense: in other words aggression would break out that the
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reduced force could not quell. Others would favor perpetuating the force as a
kind of bureaucratic animal growing at a compounding annual rate of 10%.
There is no easy solution to this problem, and it must be recognized at the
outset.
This dilemma is not limited to multinational forces, clearly, since the same
factors exist within each nation as it tries to calculate the correct size of its
military. What is different is that if the multinational force drives out all
national defenses, and subsequently is cut below a critical level, then aggres-
sion could arise that no force in the world could counter.
F. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF A COMBINED FORCE
A stand-alone military force, such as comprised in a garrison port
complex, should be designed to be able to perform all maintenance through
the depot level. This is facilitated if standardized equipment is used as much
as possible. A network of air logistics would interconnect the garrison ports,
and provide the means to transship logistics support. In addition to
indigenous air and sea lift, each command would establish whatever ar-
rangements would be necessary to increase mobilization capacity from the
assets of local nations. Any significant military action would necessitate
moving additional forces and equipment.
In the case of ships assigned to duty with the United Nations forces,
additional logistics is required. Since only the back-fitted standard equipment
would be readily supported by the repair and supply facilities, each ship must
have its systems catalogued in a standard fashion and supply support
provided by the home nation.
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Should "special services" be offered by the garrison port complex, such as
providing the hardware and personnel support for a surface-to-air missile
defense site or early warning radar site, the services would be billed as a
separate expense to the contracting state. These services could provide an
attractive alternative to local defense forces, and further inhibit any regional
conflict by placing highly trained professional forces directly in the path of an
aggressor. No undue logistics problems would result from such installations,
as all equipment would be of a standard design.
By fracturing the logistics structure into eight equal segments, the system
as a whole would be immune from sudden attack. Major supply centers and
repair facilities in eight garrison ports would replicate one another, and provide
immediate back-up should one or two be attacked and destroyed.
G. SUMMARY
The use of the United Nations as a military organization is both an at-
tractive and viable option for the future. The risk of assigning large inventories
of personnel and equipment to a multinational force with multinational
leadership is: our national interests might be ignored in favor of other interests.
However, in the broadest sense, this "problem" is one of misperception of
American interests. The concerns which are usually cited as being a problem
are primarily with the marketplace, and not with the rights of man.
The rewards for using an international rubric for maintaining the peace
are many. First of all, if the decision process to use limited force is relegated to
the regional commander, rapid response to aggression is possible.
Peacekeeping is generally not a political process. Warfighting, on the other
hand, is. When a multinational force acts to maintain the peace, it can do so
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with the self-assurance of a policeman on his beat. When the forces of a single
nation are used, however, the peacekeeping role comes very close to
warmaking. There certainly will exist situations where even a multinational
force can not move without the direction of political leaders, but those
occurrences would arise in either event.
The financing of a multinational force presents some interesting possibili-
ties. Up to now, many nations-especially Japan-have reaped the harvest of
peace without paying for the costs. If peacekeeping goes international then
there is no excuse for not contributing to the effort. Financing the expense
through the assessment of a tariff on international trade would only be par-
tially correct, since the internal economies of nations also benefit from assured
peace. Export-import economies such as Japan could rightly object to such a
basis for assessing contributions. Dues, as in United Nations dues, are not
readily collectible from truculent nations. In this the United States has demon-
strated its ability to dodge un-mandated liabilities. Therefore assessing dues
based on perceived "benefits" is a tenuous method of financing operations.
Withholding services, i. e. not defending a nation for non-payment, is not a
viable option. The only leverage which would exist is the amorphous "world
opinion," which might coerce compliance with reasonably calculated dues.
There is every reason to believe a multinational force would be less
expensive and more efficient than many national forces. The economic law of
comparative advantage is clearly applicable: a specialized force is more
efficient than many less trained and well equipped forces.
A United Nations military defensive structure is an idea which we may
not be able to refuse. It could not occur in a vacuum. Economic conflicts, such
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as the problem with Europe '92 and Japan, must also have an effective forum
for resolution. However, there is no overriding reason to not support the
concept, and many important reasons for doing so.
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VI. THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION
The problem is "what shall be the form of the United States' security
structure in light of the changes that have occurred in the world." Any solution
to this problem must be measured against its ability to accomplish the national
interests. That solution which best succeeds in attaining our national interests
is the optimal solution. Although so much appears obvious, it must be noted
that many spurious interests compete with the genuine ones in measuring the
effectiveness of a potential solution.
A. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS REVISITED
As previously developed, the national interests of the United States are
generated from the unique perspective of the individual-as-sovereign. The
interests themselves-to be free of external threat, to have a peaceful world, to
be free of the tyranny of other men or social organizations, and to protect
private property, free speech and free press-are the driving needs which
organize not only the national agenda, but also the local and international
agendas.
It is necessarily consistent that the interests of the sovereign, the indi-
vidual man, are unchanging both in his immediate environment and in distant
places. The national level is really an accidental and arbitrary delineation.
Although it is a highly visible and powerful level, this has nothing to do with the
underlying interests themselves.
Many people in the world believe there is an American Empire. They see
American involvement everywhere. They note the presence of American
armed force in many lands. They cite the proliferation of American culture as
cultural imperialism. But they fail to understand the essential kernel of America.
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If each man is a sovereign, endowed with inalienable rights, then he is not
a chattel, a mere possession, of some other sovereign. Accepting this to be
true, then the boundaries which separated earlier "sovereigns," international
borders, have no real meaning. Thus the "American Empire" spills out from
the United States into any place where an individual accepts the truth of his
own sovereignty and struggles to make it a fact. As an empire it is unique from
the aspect that it is absolutely dispersed. Washington has little impact in
making policy for the "empire." Yet, it must be admitted, some aspects of
"empire" surround the result.
Military force is concentrated to some degree at the national level, but it
also exists at the state level in the form of state guards and police, at the local
level in the form of police and the posse, and finally and not insignificantly at
the individual level as a result of the inalienable right to possess deadly arms.
The individual sovereigns will not be easily dispossessed, but they will also
cooperate to make a common defense.
As the number of men and women who have accepted their sovereignty
and struggled to realize the same has grown, so has the region grown in which
we must accomplish our national interests. In terms of the traditional
boundaries established by monarchs, our interests are international. However,
we are in no way beholden to those people who willingly submit themselves to
their political party, their corporation, their language, or to their theocrat.
These people are not individual sovereigns, they are mere chattel and are also
potentially dangerous, since their sovereign could decide to use them against
US.
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B. THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The new world order was born in the Soviet Union. Previously adhering
to the premise that the East and West must not only conflict, but eventually
war, the Soviets changed their orientation.
It is impossible to imagine the realisation of this ambitious project [to
resurrect the Soviet economy] unless there is a major reallocation of
resources-human, financial, production facilities, raw materials-from
the military sector of the economy to the civilian. Likewise it is difficult to
see how there could be such a shift so long as the old-style, Soviet
political thinking prevailed. Hence the advent of the 'new political
thinking' (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie), which is founded on the premises
that countries of differing economic and social systems have differing
legitimate interests; that the world-and, therefore, the states in it-are
interdependent; that nuclear war is inconceivable (the principal
agreement to emere from the Geneva Summit); and that the
superpowers should aim for 'sufficiency' in defence. The corollary to the
new thinking is disarmament. [Ref. 55, pp. 7-8]
The advent of new political thinking eclipsed the inherent hostility which
characterized all previous Soviet political relations with the West. Behavior
has followed and confirmed the change in policy.
There remain thousands of nuclear warheads on weapons pointed at the
United States, and similarly at the Soviet Union. However, the deadly embrace
of the Cold War is broken. The probability of conflict with the Soviet Union is
much less, and now the significance of conflict elsewhere becomes more
important.
Some authors have long believed that the institutionalized struggle
between East and West was essentially a game, and like any game the only
way to stop it was simply to stop. "The game stops (if it is a two-party game-
as the arms race mostly is) only when one of the players gets up and says, 'I'm
not going to play anymore.'...I mean it. The game is over. Finished. [Ref. 56, p.
2781"
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In some sense this is exactly what happened. Gorbachev said, "It's over,"
and the game ended. Yet prior to then, when the "old-style Soviet political
thinking" prevailed, Soviet arms were intended to impress Soviet will on the
West. The same author cited above, M. Scott Peck, said: "heretical (unreal)
thinking is dangerous only because it tends to lead to unrealistic, and hence
dangerous behavior. [Ref. 54, pp. 245-6]" Not responding to the military
strength of the Soviet Union, simply to "end the game" has to at least be con-
sidered as unreal thinking.
C. UNILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL DEFENSE
The key issue in determining the optimal solution to strategic de-
fense is the choice between unilateral and multilateral defense. This is not, it
should be noted, an either/or question. Unilateral forces can augment
multilateral arrangements. It is a matter of emphasis rather than outright
choice.
1. Unilateral Defense
A nation of individual sovereigns, the United States, faces a world in
which few others completely share our goals. Even familiar states, such as
Japan, may not serve as allies who would support the interests which are es-
sential to America. Allies are nations, and even in the best case nations are
only representatives of the true sovereigns. Unilateral defense allows us to
escape the difficulties of making allies of tyrants or having to support those we
would otherwise oppose.
By maintaining large national defense forces, the United States is
able to move where and when it must. If large enough forces can be main-
tained, unilateral defense is viable. However, the fiscal cost of doing so may
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not be possible to bear. The costs of providing our own sealift and mobile
basing appears to exceed the benefits achieved by avoiding the frustrations of
shared decision making with equivocating allies.
2. Multilateral Defense
There are a number of forms of multilateral defense. Each has its
own merits and demerits.
a. Natural allies
Forming an alliance with those few nations that are so similar to
the United States that creating a common defense would not threaten
compromise of our national interests is attractive. The problem is that there
are too few nations that qualify as natural allies. Although the distribution of
these nations is generally broad-Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and
perhaps some other European nations-vital parts of the globe still exist which
are not proximate to any of them.
b. Regional Alliances
NATO served as an excellent regional alliance during the Cold
War against the Soviet Union. Yet today it loses importance as the nature of
the threat to the United States has changed. Other regional alliances have
similarly suffered. Ad hoc alliances, as in the Persian Gulf, have a strictly military
purpose but do not serve most of our national interests. The strikingly similar
common element of regional and ad hoc alliances is the existence of a single
common enemy. Hopefully, the world will be free of any single, common, and




The creation of a genuine international defensive structure
under autonomous control is an alternative that has special merits. Significant
forces could be concentrated in locations selected for their logical purpose, as
opposed to their political convenience. Rapid military response to any
outbreak of international violence would deter international aggression. A
permanent force structure financed by the people who reap the benefits of
peace would properly share the burden that today falls heavily on those who
can rather than those who ought to maintain the peace.
The objectives of the United States are not generally removed
from nor at odds with those of mankind. We would, therefore, have a great
deal to gain and little to lose by opting for international defense. It is
preferable to finding allies who, while individually objectionable, are well sited
and politically expedient to support so as to maintain basing and overflight
rights.
By establishing a significant international force structure, we
would not be prevented from maintaining an independent national force.
Thus, in the event a regional power like India decides to "protect Indian
citizens" in a second nation, the resident international force could be ballooned
by not only other U. N. garrisons, but by our own forces as well.
International defense is a logical and rational next step in the
world. It is made even a more viable alternative by the fact that the United
States can not afford to maintain the kind of force structure that it has
developed over the past forty years. It is also made more viable by the fact
that the clear and present threats of the near future have changed so radically
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from the recent past. The agonizing closed societies of the world, the tribal
states, which fear and resent the imposition of the open society of the West
present the greatest threat to peace. Limited interdiction by a non-political
multinational strike force is the ideal means of excising the military/terrorist
capabilities of these tribal entities.
D. LOGISTICS FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER
In logistics there is no greater error than preparing for the wrong
strategy. Continuing to prepare for unilateral/NATO defense is to move
towards that error. The better course is to begin to prepare for the advent of
international defense. This requires a clear delineation of the relative
importance of the multinational force and the national force. It appears today
that the FMS system, perhaps with good cause, places the FMS client far
behind the national force. If this continues in the future, the international force
would have no rational alternative but to eschew American weapons in favor
of those which will be supported. Moreover, if the logistics structure is to be
integrated between national and international forces-as clearly it ought-then
the United States logistics structure must become skilled in new areas.
Purchasing in foreign states is different than doing business in America.
Providing the technical documentation for weapons systems in a range of
languages is a new necessity. So too is the need to integrate a large number of
foreign manufactured systems into both the national and international logistics
system.
The New World Order is a catch phrase for change. The present logistics
system, built up over the past decades in support of missions and objectives
which are no longer viable, will change just a surely as the force structure
118
changes. The immediate task is to understand the changes that have occurred,
and to search out the features and dimensions of the future. The next task is to
anticipate the results and facilitate creation of the iogistical structure necessary
to support them.
It is not enough that operational logistics planners-those dealing with
port capabilities, strategic lift, shuttle lift, in-theater support services,
forwara battle damage repair, medical. support, and battle force
logistics-must deal with deliberate planning and defined strategies.
They must look at optional scenarios envisioned conceptually in the
maritime strategy and plan for a wide range of scenarios... [Ref. 57]
The optimal solution to provide defense is to create a viable international
structure augmented with as small a national force as necessary. Concurrently,
the logistics must be designed to support these structures as efficiently and
effectively as possible.
As the world hurtles into the future, preparations must be made. Until all
the world comes to accept the sovereignty of man and accepts his rights and
responsibilities, there will be wars. A new phase is unfolding and many of the
rules are changing, but our task remains. Oppose external threats. Enforce
peace abroad. Defend men from the tyranny of all forms of despotism.
Ensure the rights of private property, freedom of speech, and a free press.
These are the stars to steer by. Although we have cleared the rocky shoals of
the Cold War, we have not completed the voyage. Nor in our lifetimes or even
during our children's or grandchildren's lifetimes is it likely to be complete. Yet
it is truly auspicious that we enter a new millennium having made the progress
we have. There is hope, and there is also work to be done.
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APPENDIX
The calculations involved in estimating necessary on-hand stock in
Chapter IV are as follows. The number of line items, i. e. different repair parts,
involved exceeds several hundred. For each line item a mean annual demand
was calculated, along with a measure of the standard deviation of demand.
The standard deviation formula employed is:
-(xi - 3Z)2S
n-1
The resulting calculations found the average standard deviation of demand
to be 0.986 years. The average mean demand, however, was found to be only 0.2
demands per year. This creates a problem, since with low-demand items it is
often assumed that the most appropriate statistical distribution is the Poisson
distribution.
Inventory Management, NAVSUP Publication P-553, in appendix H to
chapter 2, delineates that for demand frequency (therein termed "procurement
problem variable," which is essentially the demand expected during leadtime
for initial wholesale stock requirements) greater than 20, a Normal Distribution
is used, for demand levels between 1 and 20 a Negative Binomial Distribution
is used, and for demands less than 1 the Poisson Distribution is used.
The Poisson distribution is convenient to use because it is tractable. In
fact a Poisson distribution has a single parameter, usually termed X (lambda)
that is equal to both its expected value, E(X) or mean value, and its variance,
V(X). In the case of the data at hand, the mean and variance are widely
120
separated. The mean, as stated, is 0.2. The variance, which is equal to the
standard deviation squared, s2, is 0.9862 or 0.972.
Since the distribution parameter is equal to both the variance and mean,
either could be taken to be true. Consider the consequences of accepting the
mean as X when computing the probability of not stocking out 95% of the time.
X 
- ,Q -! 
Qp(i) and Yp(i):< R5 I p(i)
pii)-O i-O
where Q is the quantity to stock and R is the probability 0.95
With X equal to 0.2, stocking one part results in a 0.983 probability of not
being stocked out. Therefore, only one part is required to satisfy the goal of
having 95% coverage. With X equal to 0.972, however, three parts are required
reach 98.3% coverage, because with only two parts a level of 92.5% certainty of
not stocking out is attained.
The difference between the two levels is evident. They are obviously not
the same. This is because the distribution is not a Poisson distribution, but
some other distribution.
A danger exists when, in order to make the mathematics less cumber-
some, an unwarranted assumption is made-such as applying the Poisson or
Normal distribution-because the actual variability of the process can be
thrown out in the process.
In this case each of the over two-hundred fifty standard deviations were
measured and compared to their related means. It is evident that no tractable
distribution approximates how these repairable parts were actually demanded.
Therefore the best alternative is to accept the estimate of the standard
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deviation, as calculated with the formula cited in the first paragraph, and
absorb the greater variability through higher stockage levels. This can be done
by building an empirical distribution based upon the data. The information on
each part is too scanty to allow much interpretation. However, either taken all
together or broken down into families of similar parts, an empirical distribution
can be generated. From this it is possible to perform the mathematics to
determine what stockage levels are necessary to achieve required certainty.
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